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The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978:
A Critical Analysis
By RUSSEL' LAWRENCE BARSH*
Enacted in 1978, the Indian Child Welfare Act1 (Act) is the result
of an attempt by Congress to promote the stability of Indian families
and tribes.2 Responding to a demonstrated risk of unwarranted re-
moval of Indian children from their homes by state and private child
welfare agencies, 3 the Act was intended to impose strict procedural lim-
itations on these agencies' activities. 4 Unfortunately, the Act falls far
short of achieving the goals set by Congress.
In addition to authorizing special grants for Indian child welfare
services, the Act creates seven major procedural safeguards for Indian
child custody proceedings. Exclusive tribal jurisdiction is established
over reservation children, except where jurisdiction previously was lost
to the states under federal law.5 Furthermore, tribes are authorized to
petition the government to reassume such previously lost jurisdiction.
6
The Act also provides that state jurisdiction over child custody pro-
ceedings may be transferred to tribal courts at the tribe's or the parents'
request.7 Both the tribe and the parents are given the right to notice
* Associate Professor of Business, Government & Society, Graduate School of Busi-
ness Administration, University of Washington. Member, Washington State Bar.
1. Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 25
U.S.C.).
2. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (Supp. II 1978).
3. Id. § 1901(4). See generally Indian Child Wefare Act of 1977: Hearing on S. 1214
Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977) [hereinafter
cited as 1977Hearing]. Figures from three states relied on by the Senate indicate the pro-
portion of Indian foster care placements in non-Indian homes: New York (97%); Maine
(64%); and Utah (88%). Id. at 538. See also id. at 114 (statement of Drs. Carl E. Mindell
and Alan Gurwitt, American Academy of Child Psychiatry) (85% of Indian children in fos-
ter care placed in non-Indian homes in survey of 16 states); AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY
REVIEW COMMISSION, REPORT ON FEDERAL, STATE, AND TRIBAL JURISDICTION 85 (Comm.
Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 REPORT] (Washington reports 80%, Wyoming 57%, in
non-Indian foster homes).
4. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (Supp. If 1978).
5. Id. § 1911(a).
6. Id. § 1918.
7. Id. § 1911o(b).
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and the right to intervene in state proceedings involving Indian chil-
dren.8 The Act requires that higher standards of proof be applied in
Indian child custody proceedings9 and mandates that placement of In-
dian children by state agencies be subject to special preferences for In-
dian families and communities. 10 It also stipulates that consent by
Indian parents to adoption or placement must be informed and is revo-
cable for extended periods of time." Finally the Act secures both
tribes' and parents' access to state records.
12
Although these provisions are well intentioned, their effectiveness
is limited by inconsistencies and ambiguities in the drafting of the Act.
Consequently, the Act may confuse and even exacerbate the problems
which prompted its passage.
This Article summarizes and evaluates the most severe shortcom-
ings of the Indian Child Welfare Act, beginning with a summary of the
problems that previously existed in Indian child custody proceedings.
The congressional response to these problems, in the form of the Act, is
then discussed and analyzed. The enforcement provisions of the Act
and the guidelines promulgated thereunder by the Secretary of the In-
terior are reviewed in a separate section. Suggestions are made
throughout for increasing the effectiveness of the Act, both in its imple-
mentation and by amendment.
A "National Crisis"
The Human Factor
I said that the tribe was concerned that if many more of their chil-
dren were taken, because there's been quite a history of taking these
kids from this reservation, that they were afraid that their very sur-
vival would be at stake.
And, the codirector of this county welfare office responded to
that by shrugging his shoulders and saying, "So, what?' ' 3
Nationwide, Indian children have been removed from their homes
with unusual frequency. 14 By conservative estimates, one out of five
8. Id. §§ 1911(c), 1912(a).
9. Id. § 1912(e)-(f).
10. Id. § 1915.
11. Id. § 1913.
12. Id. §§ 1912(c), 1951.
13. Indian Child We/fare Program.: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of
the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as 1974 Hearings] (statement of Bertram Hirsch, counsel for the Association on Ameri-
can Indian Affairs).
14. The following table, adapted from data collected by the Association on American
Indian Affairs (AAIA) and appearing in 1977 Hearing, supra note 3, at 538, 603, compares
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Indian children has lived in a foster or adoptive home at some time,
1 5
the number of foster placements per 1,000 of Indian and non-Indian children in a number of
states:
Indian Children in Foster Care Placements






























































Arizona does not report placements by race; the figure here is an estimate. A random sam-
ple of county records suggests the actual figure may be greater.
An estimate of adoptions per 1,000 of Indian children as compared with non-Indian
children in several states also may be derived from the AAIA data appearing in 1977 Hear-
ing, supra note 3:
Adoptions of Indian Children
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and one out of six has lived in a non-Indian home. 16 Compared with
White children, Indian children tend to remain under foster care longer
and tend to be moved from foster home to foster home more fre-
quently.17 The public cost of this disproportionately high rate of sub-
stitute care is great; an average of approximately $1,000 per year for
each foster child.18
The costs of massive displacement of Indian children from their
homes and tribes have been severe. Prolonged substitute care during
youth has been associated with high alcohol abuse and suicide rates
Only four state have records of the percentage of adopted Indian children who are adopted
by non-Indians: Alaska (93%); California (92%); Montana (87%); and North Dakota (75%).
Of the thirteen states listed above, 80% of all adopted Indian children were adopted before
their first birthdays. See also 1976 REPORT, supra note 3, at 81-85, 177-242; 1974 Hearings,
supra note 13, at 72-94, 231-52.
15. Cf. 1976 REPORT, supra note 3, at 79 (25-30% raised by non-Indians in homes and
institutions); 1977 Hearing, supra note 3, at 1 (minimum of 25% of Indian children in foster
homes, adoptive homes, or boarding schools); id. at 113 (one out of nine in foster homes,
adoptive homes, institutions or boarding facilities in three states); id. at 187 (25-30% sepa-
rated from their families). In 1968, 25% of all Devil's Lake Sioux children were in foster
homes, adoptive homes, or institutions. See 1974 Hearings, supra note 13, at 95. In 1971.
14% of children from the Warm Springs reservation were either in foster homes or under
institutional care. See id. at 101. See also 1977Hearing, supra note 3, at 360, 599 (Washing-
ton statistics); 1974 Hearings, supra note 13, at 146 (Minnesota statistics).
16. A 1969 Association on American Indian Affairs survey of 16 states found 85% of all
Indian child placements were with non-Indian families. 1974 Hearings, supra note 13, at 17.
Individual tribes vary from this average. In 1974, 85% of the foster placements of Yakima
children were with non-Indian homes, as were 75% of the adoptions. Id. at 120, 123-28. At
the Rosebud Sioux reservation in South Dakota, however, 61% of adoptions and 64% of
foster placements were with non-Indians. Id. at 155-56. Placement rates in individual states
also vary. Rates of foster placements with non-Indian families five years ago were 95% in
Washington and Oregon, 93% in California, 87% in Montana, and 75% in North Dakota.
1977Hearing, supra note 3, at 303-18; Red Bird & Melendy, Indian Child We/fare in Oregon
[hereinafter cited as Red Bird & Melend], in THE DESTRUCTION OF AMERICAN INDIAN
FAMILES 45 (S. Unger ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Unger]. In a 1966 study of Child Wel-
fare League of America records, 93% of adoptions of Indian children were by non-Indian
families. Lyslo, Adoptive Placements ofIndian Children, CATH. CHARITIES REV., Feb. 1967,
at 23-25. A high proportion of placements also are made out of state. In 1976 the Colville
Tribe found that 85% of its foster children were placed with non-Indians, and 23% were
removed to homes in other states. 1977 Hearing, supra note 3, at 271. Cf. 1976 REPORT,
supra note 3, at 79 (25-35% of all Indian children raised by non-Indians in homes and
institutions).
17. In a detailed study of Yakima children in foster care, for example, 88% had been in
more than one foster home and 54% had been in more than two. 1974 Hearings, supra note
13, at 123-28. The ratio of foster placements to adoptive placements is significantly higher
among Indians than among non-Indians. See, e.g., 1977 Hearing, supra note 3, at 385.
18. See 1974 Hearings, supra note 3, at 324-26 (statistics for New Mexico and Minne-
sota).
[Vol. 31
within the Indian population.' 9 Psychiatrists report that Indians raised
in non-Indian homes tend to have significant social problems in adoles-
cence and adulthood.20 According to a report prepared in 1975 for the
American Academy of Child Psychiatry,
[t]here is much clinical evidence to suggest that these Native Ameri-
can children placed in off-reservation non-Indian homes are at risk
in their later development. Often enough they are cared for by de-
voted and well-intentioned foster or adoptive parents. Nonetheless,
particularly in adolescence, they are subject to ethnic confusion and
a pervasive sense of abandonment .... 21
Frequently, when these children become adults they find themselves
being treated as Indians, but do not know how to behave like Indians.
22
Prolonged substitute care thus creates a vicious cycle that works to
break up and dissipate Indian families. Stricken by a "constant sense
of not knowing where they will be or how long they'll be there,"
'23
young Indian adults may find it extremely difficult to establish perma-
nent roots. Their fear of loss leads to the conclusion that close personal
contact is impossible, perhaps seriously impairing their ability to be
parents.
24
The removal of a child from his or her home also affects parents
and remaining children. In a recent report of eight case studies, Uni-
versity of Minnesota psychiatrist Joseph Westermeyer observed that
the removal of a child "effectively destroyed the family as an intact
unit. The parents invariably separated. It exacerbated the problems of
alcoholism, unemployment, and emotional duress among the par-
ents."'25 Puyallup Tribal Chairperson Ramona Bennett succinctly
19. See 1977Hearing, supra note 3, at 156-57 (statement of National Tribal Chairmen's
Association); 1974 Hearings, supra note 13, at 6, 28 (statement of William Byler, Association
on American Indian Affairs, quoting National Institute for Mental Health).
20. 1974 Hearings, supra note 13, at 46-47 (statement of Dr. Joseph Westermeyer); see
1976 REPORT, supra note 3, at 87; 1977 Hearing, supra note 3, at 355 (statement of Don
Milligan); 1974 Hearings, supra note 13, at 113-14 (statement of Dr. James Shore and Wil-
liam Nicolls); id. at 117-18 (statement of Mel Sampson, Northwest Affiliated Tribes).
21. 1977 Hearing, supra note 3, at 114 (statement of Drs. Carl Mindell and Alan
Gurwitt, American Academy of Child Psychiatry); see also 1974 Hearings, supra note 17, at
56 (statement of Drs. Mindell and Gurwitt).
22. 1974 Hearings, supra note 13, at 49 (statement of Dr. Joseph Westermeyer); id. at
129 (statement of Dr. Robert Bergman, Indian Health Service).
23. Id. at 58 (statement of Drs. Carl Mindell and Alan Gurwitt).
24. Id. See also Lefley, Acculturation, Child-rearing, and Sef-esteem in Two North
American Indian Tribes, 4 ETHOs 385-401 (1976). Lefley found that children from relatively
more traditional Florida Indian families had better self-concepts and motivation than chil-
dren of more "acculturated" families, suggesting that a coherent and complete tribal experi-
ence is more healthy.
25. Westermeyer, The Ravage of the Indian Families in Crisis, in Unger, supra note 16,
at 54.
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stated the parents' perspective: "[I]f you lose your children, you are
dead; you are never going to be rehabilitated, [and] you are never going
to get well."'2 6 Furthermore, family breakup following the removal of a
child increases the likelihood that any remaining children also will be
removed from the home. Indeed, one psychologist has argued that the
frequency and notoriety of Indian child placements has led Indian par-
ents to expect the removal of their children as a matter of course.27 The
logical result in many cases is poor parental behavior and fear of emo-
tional attachments.
Efforts by informal family support institutions in tribal communi-
ties to resolve these problems have been frustrated in recent years by
the widespread fragmentation of Indian families and the economic
conditions existing on many reservations.28 Solutions aimed primarily
at eliminating poverty as the cause of the problem, however, are likely
to face poor results. Many observers consider the "shocking" disparity
in placement rates for Indian and non-Indian children as a more signif-
icant factor in family breakups than poverty;29 a cause of poverty
rather than an effect.30 Although no rule says poor families cannot pro-
vide good parental models, 31 no family can provide good parenting
under constant threat of losing the children. Hence, the human costs
resulting from displaced Indian children not only are devastating to
families today, but also perpetuate the problem in future generations.
Institutional Causes
Many institutional factors are implicated in the frequency of In-
dian child placements, including the treatment afforded Indian families
by social service professionals, state social welfare agencies, private
26. 1977 Hearing, supra note 3, at 164. See id. at 167.
27. Attneave, The Wasted Strength afIndian Familes, in Unger, supra note 16, at 29-33.
See also H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 7530 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 95-1386].
28. "Poor living conditions, unemployment on reservations, and other factors create a
breakdown of the concept of the extended family. No longer is there a willing grandmother,
aunt, or sister who will assume child care for a relative. Often a sick or distraught Indian
mother seeks to place her children off the reservation in a non-Indian home because of
alienation with her own relatives." 1974 Hearings, supra note 13, at 253 (statement of Rob-
ert Lewis, National Tribal Chairmen's Association).
29. H. R. REP. No. 95-1386, supra note 27, at 9.
30. Compare 1974 Hearings, supra note 13, at 13, 26-27 (statements of William Byler)
with Westermeyer, The Ravage of Indian Families in Crisis, in Unger, supra note 16, at 54.
31. "Because of poverty and discrimination Indian families face many difficulties, but
there is no reason or justification for believing that these problems make Indian parents unfit
to raise their children." 1977 Hearing, supra note 3, at I (statement of Senator James
Abourezk).
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adoption services, state laws, and the courts. Evaluating the effective-
ness of the Indian Child Welfare Act requires in examination of those
attitudes and procedures that lead to excessive Indian child placements,
many of which the Act does not address.
In the past, most Indian child placements went through state
courts and state welfare agencies, largely because few tribal govern-
ments operated child protective services or family support programs.
More recently, despite evidence that tribal programs and other cultur-
ally relevant, nontraditional services have succeeded in keeping Indian
families intact where traditional state agencies have failed,32 federal
funding for child welfare often has been distributed directly to state
governments,33 some of which may be reluctant to subcontract with
tribes. Most tribal child welfare professionals have been funded, if at
all, through temporary, nonformula federal sources. 34 Even where
tribes have evolved effective, on-reservation child welfare services, tri-
bal jurisdiction over reservation children has been ignored by state
agencies, 35 and tribal court orders determining custody have not been
recognized by state courts.
36
The treatment of Indian children by state courts is of critical im-
portance because of the degree of state court involvement in Indian
child custody proceedings. The Bureau of Indian Affairs, although
funded for direct social services to Indian families, 37 refers about half
32. See 1977 Hearing, supra note 3, at 79 (statement of Goldie Denny); id. at 414-28
(detailing Indian Adoption Program); 1974 Hearings, supra note 13, at 101-03 (statement of
Dr. James Shore); id. at 109-12 (statement of Dr. James Shore and William Nicolls);
Ishisaka, American Indians and Foster Care: Cultural Factors and Separation, 57 CHILD
WELFARE 299-308 (1978).
33. See 1977 Hearing, supra note 3, at 230-35 (statement of Gregory Frazier); 1974
Hearings, supra note 13, at 24 (statement of William Byler). See also Federal Domestic
Assistance Programs: Hearing Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1977).
34. See 1977 Hearing, supra note 3, at 163 (statement of Ramona Bennett).
35. This was the conclusion of the Department of Justice. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386,
supra note 27, at 35. The case law on this subject is examined in some detail at text accom-
panying notes 85-97 infra.
36. See 1976 REPORT, supra note 3, at 87. But see id. (some states do recognize deter-
minations by tribal courts).
37. Funding is provided under the general authority of the Snyder Act, 25 U.S.C. § 13
(1976). Allocations to child welfare services have been relatively small, projected at a static
level of $3.3 million for the fiscal years 1978 to 1980. UNITED STATES OFFICE OF MANAGE-
MENT AND BUDGET, THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 573 app. (1979).
That allocation works out to about $10 per Indian child. In 1973, a survey by the North
American Indian Women's Association located 115 Bureau of Indian Affairs social workers
nationwide. 1974 Hearings, supra note 13, at 324.
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of its on-reservation caseload to state programs.38 Consequently, more
than three-fourths of Indian child welfare matters have been managed
by state agencies, although only about one-half of the nation's Indian
population resides off-reservation. 39 In recent years the situation has
been aggravated as an increasing number of young Indian families
have sought temporary work or educational opportunities in urban ar-
eas, briefly exposing themselves to state jurisdiction.
40
Ignorance or Bias of Non-Indian Caseworkers
Non-Indian social workers have been criticized as being insensi-
tive to or contemptful of traditional tribal values.4 Caseworkers unfa-
miliar with Indian communities, not surprisingly tend to misinterpret
family and child behavior;42 healthy childhood environments differ
widely among societies.4 3 For example, non-Indian professionals have
considered leaving a child with persons outside the nuclear family as
evidence of neglect and as grounds for removal of the child.44 This
view ignores accepted conduct in Indian families where, "[b]y custom
38. 1974 Hearings, supra note 13, at 324.
39. See 1977 Hearing, supra note 3, at 112. For the demography of Indian families, see
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION, SUBJECT REPORT: AMERICAN IN-
DIANS (1973).
40. See 1976 REPORT, supra note 3, at 86-87; 1977 Hearing, supra note 3, at 350 (state-
ment of Don Milligan). Federal boarding schools constitute another factor in the Indian
child welfare problem. Lacking public education opportunities in their own communities,
approximately 17% of all Indian children spend most of their childhood boarded out at
Bureau of Indian Affairs schools. H. R. REP. No. 95-1386, supra note 27, at 9. For a discus-
sion of the problem, see 1977Hearing, supra note 3, at 112-13; 1974 Hearings, supra note 13,
at 129, 131-32. The Act, however, merely calls for a study of the situation. 25 U.S.C. § 1961
(Supp. 11 1978).
41. 1976 REPORT, supra note 3, at 281; see 1977 Hearing, supra note 3, at 155-56 (state-
ment of National Tribal Chairmen's Association); id. at 281 (resolution of the Nez Perce
Tribal Executive Committee); Unger, supra note 16, at iii.
42. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, supra note 27, at 10; 1977Hearing, supra note 3, at 140
(statement of Dr. Marlene Echohawk); id. at 155-56 (statement of the National Tribal Chair-
men's Association); id. at 266 (statement of Virgil Gunn). See also I AMERICAN INDIAN
POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, 94TH CONG., 1ST SESS., FINAL REPORT 422 (Comm. Print
1977). "[Non-Indian social workers] are not equipped sufficiently in the knowledge of In-
dian cultural values. . . to know whether or not the behavior an Indian child or an Indian
parent is exhibiting is, in fact, abnormal behavior in his own society." 1974 Hearings, supra
note 13, at 4 (statement of William Byler). See 1976 REPORT, supra note 3, at 79-80.
43. "Some Navajos might find, for example, that breathing the polluted air of Wash-
ington, D.C., presents a far greater danger to a child's physical and emotional well-being
than does being left alone in a hogan for several hours. Needless to say, residents of Wash-
ington, D.C. will find greater harm in the latter situation." 1977 Hearing, supra note 3, at
278 (statement of DNA-People's Legal Services, Inc.).
44. Id. at 316-17 (statement of National Indian Health Board). See H.R. REP. No. 95-
1386, supra note 27, at 10; 1974 Hearings, supra note 13, at 18 (statement of William Byler).
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and tradition, if not necessity, members of the extended family have
definite responsibilites and duties in assisting in childrearing." 45 In ad-
dition, state agencies often have refused to recognize the validity of
customary adoptions within an extended family group;46 Oregon had a
regulation prohibiting foster placements within an extended family
group,47 and Mississippi rules forbid the adoption of a Choctaw child
by a Choctaw family on the theory that it would violate the natal fam-
ily's right to privacy.48 Similarly, the lack of close parental supervision
and avoidance of physical punishment of Indian children, although
considered desirable parenting practices in Indian families,49 have been
cited as indications of parental neglect in state proceedings.50
Factors other than parental practices also impact upon Indian
child placements. Materialism often plays a role in professional judg-
ments. A child's material possessions, or lack thereof, sometimes are
regarded as more salient evidence of parental concern than is affec-
tion.5' Not the least of the factors affecting the decisions of non-Indian
caseworkers has been the stereotyping of Indians as alcoholics. Al-
though alcohol abuse has been a problem for many Indian families,
non-Indian families with alcohol problems are more likely to be given
supportive services as an alternative to removal of their children.
52
The prevalence of culturally inappropriate standards for the re-
This was precisely the situation in DeCoteau v. District County Court, 87 S.D. 555, 211
N.W.2d 843 (1973), aftd, 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
45. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, supra note 27, at 20. Leonard Jimson provides an outline
of Navajo custom governing extended family relationships in Jimson, Parent-ChildRelation-
shifs in Law and in Navajo Custom, in Unger, supra note 16 at 67-78. The significance of
extended families in the control and distribution of property is discussed in Shepardson &
Hammond, Navajo Inheritance Patterns. Random or Regular?, 5 ETHNOLOGY 87 (1966).
46. See 1977Hearing, supra note 3, at 115-16 (statement of Drs. Carl Mindell and Alan
Gurwitt); 1974 Hearings, supra note 13, at 51-53 (statement of Mrs. Alex Fournier).
47. Unger, supra note 16, at 46.
48. 1977 Hearing, supra note 3, at 175 (statement of Gloria York).
49. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1368, supra note 27, at 10; 1974 Hearings, supra note 13, at 4.
The philosophy of this childrearing approach is discussed in D. LEE, FREEDOM AND CUL-
TURE 59-69 (1959). The infrequency of physical punishment results in few Indian children
being removed from their families on the ground of physical abuse. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386,
supra note 27, at 10; 1976 REPORT, supra note 3, at 80 n.6; 1977Hearing, supra note 3, at 317
(statement of Howard E. Tommie); 1974 Hearings, supra note 13, at 101 (statement of Dr.
James Shore).
50. 1974 Hearings, supra note 13, at 103 (statement of Dr. James Shore).
51. See 1977 Hearing, supra note 3, at 77 (statement of Goldie Denny, now Director of
Social Services for the Quinault Tribe).
52. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1368, supra note 27, at 10. See generally Red Bird &
Melend, supra note 16, at 43-46. The prevalence of this problem led to the inclusion in the
original Senate bill of a provision prohibiting the use of alcohol abuse as grounds for remov-
ing an Indian child. The rigidity of this rule was criticized by tribal governments, however,
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moval of Indian children has left many Indian families with a choice
between raising their children as non-Indians or losing them.53 As Sen-
ator James Abourezk remarked in 1977, "[p]ublic and private welfare
agencies seem to have operated on the premise that most Indian chil-
dren would really be better off growing up non-Indian. ' 54 There is evi-
dence that state caseworkers, who often lack sufficient training and
resources, have tended to remove Indian children to non-Indian homes
without first attempting to provide remedial family services. 55 Because
caseworkers lack, or are simply unaware of, alternatives such as family
counseling, they often use the threat of removing children "to whip the
family into shape when they experience difficulties.1 56 A poorly
trained caseworker may find it easier to force an Indian family into the
outward appearance of normalcy than to help the family members ac-
tually cope with their problems.57 This is simply poor social work, not
bias.
State Licensing Standards
The widespread lack of resources and alternative modes of treat-
ment provided troubled Indian families has been exacerbated by diffi-
culties in licensing Indian families as foster homes:
[O]ne of the primary reasons for this extraordinary high rate of plac-
ing Indian children with non-Indian families . . . is that the stan-
dards for being licensed as a foster home are based upon middle-
and it was omitted from the Act. 1977 Hearing, supra note 3, at 259-60 (statement of Chey-
enne River Sioux Tribe); id. at 278 (statement of DNA-People's Legal Services, Inc.).
53. See 1977 Hearing, supra note 3, at 301 (statement of National Tribal Chairmen's
Association).
54. Id. at 1. See also id. at 155-56. "In Alaska... placement agencies tend to favor
placements in urban settings where they feel the child will receive more opportunities." Id.
at 238. However, psychiatrists Mindell and Gurwitt told the House Indian Affairs Subcom-
mittee that, "as a general rule," Indian children are best raised by Indians. 1974 Hearings,
supra note 13, at 61.
55. See 1974 Hearings, supra note 13, at 47 (statement of Dr. Joseph Westermeyer);
Westermeyer, The Ravage of the Indian Families in Crisis, in Unger, supra note 16, at 54.
56. 1974 Hearings, supra note 13, at 47. See also id. at 55 (statement of Drs. Carl
Mindell and Alan Gurwitt).
57. "The policies and programs of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and state welfare de-
partments are, for the most part, directed at crisis intervention. A family is rarely assisted
until an acute crisis has arisen. Then, they feel, welfare agencies rapidly mobilize to provide
the only remedy that seems practical to them-termination of parental rights." 1977 Hear-
ing, supra note 3, a 318 (statement of the National Indian Health Board). In Arizona State
Dep't of Economic Security v. Mahoney, 24 Ariz. App. 534, 540 P.2d 153 (1975), this prac-
tice was criticized in a situation involving the placement of several Pima children: "Termi-
nation of the parent-child relationship should not be considered a panacea but should be




class values; the amount of floor space available in the home, plumb-
ing, income levels. Most of the Indian families cannot meet these
standards and the only people that can meet them are non-Indians. 58
When removal is advisable, even a culturally sensitive social worker
may find it impossible to place the Indian child in another Indian
home temporarily. Generally, state licensing standards reflect an as-
sumption that material comfort is a primary consideration in adequate
nurturing. When the North American Indian Women's Association in-
terviewed Indians who had grown up in foster care, however, they
found that most of these individuals had not been as concerned with
the physical attributes of the foster home as they were with the presence
of the foster mother at home, firm rules, and a feeling of warmth.59
Thus, cultural bias or misunderstanding affects not only the decision to
remove an Indian child from his or her family but also affects the avail-
ability of stable Indian homes for temporary or permanent substitute
care.
The "Best Interest of the Child" Rule
State courts also have suffered from ignorance, poor training, and,
on occasion, cultural bias in deciding Indian child custody disputes.
The "best interest of the child" standard, widely used in custody deter-
minations, relies heavily on subjective judicial conclusions about child
welfare and thus inevitably incorporates "cultural and familial values
which are often opposed to values held by the Indian family." 60 In
many cases, judges tend to defer to the opinions of social workers,
61
shifting the burden of proof on the issue of parental competency to the
child's parents.62 Advocates for the Act argued that "the abusive ac-
tions of social workers would largely be nullified if more judges were
themselves knowledgeable of Indian life and required a sharper defini-
tion of the standards of child abuse and neglect.
63
58. 1974 Hearings, supra note 13, at 5 (statement of William Byler). See also H.R.
REP. No. 95-1386, supra note 27, at 11; 1977 Hearing, supra note 3, at 78 (statement of
Goldie Denny); id. at 319-20 (statement of Howard E. Tommie); 1974 Hearings, supra note
13, at 50 (statement of Dr. Joseph Westermeyer); id. at 129-30 (statement of Dr. Robert
Bergman); Red Bird & Melendy, supra note 16, at 45.
59. 1974 Hearings, supra note 13, at 322. Unfortunately, the Bureau of Indian Affairs
copied state standards when licensing Indian homes on reservations. Id. at 318.
60. 1976 REPORT, supra note 3, at 79; see id. at 80; 1974 Hearings, supra note 13, at 57-
58 (statement of Drs. Carl Mindell and Alan Gurwitt); Blanchard, The Question of Best
Interest, in Unger, supra note 16, at 58-59.
61. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, supra note 27, at 10.
62. See 1974 Hearings, supra note 13, at 60-61 (statement of Drs. Carl Mindell and
Alan Gurwitt).
63. Id. at 21. See also H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, supra note 27, at 11; 1977 Hearing,
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Fortunately, not all courts accept culturally inappropriate stan-
dards for removing Indian children from their homes. 64 In Carle v.
Carle,65 the child's father was a Haida villager and a seasonal fisher-
man. The mother, a Tlingit, was remarried to a non-Indian and was
living in Juneau. An Alaska state trial judge found that there were
some very valuable aspects of the village cultural environment, "in-
clud[ing] a rapport with nature and with a community of people which
is perhaps less characteristic of urban life" 66 and "a sense of pride and
self-worth in the Native child which a community such as Juneau could
tend to suppress." 67 Nevertheless, he granted custody to the mother,
reasoning that she could provide a more stable family environment
than the father's extended family, 68 and observed:
Inevitably, the village way of life is succumbing to the
predominate [sic] caucasian, urban society of the land, and of neces-
sity the youth of the villages must confront and adjust to this new life
style. That transition can more easily be accomplished in the case of
this child at his young age than if delayed until his character and
personality are more rigidly formed.
69
On appeal, the state supreme court remanded, stating: "We think it is
not permissible in a bicultural context, to decide a child's custody on
the hypothesis that it is necessary to facilitate the child's adjustment to
what is believed to be the dominant culture. . . .It is not the function
of our courts to homogenize Alaskan society."'70 Unfortunately, this
position has been more frequently the exception than the rule.
Economic Incentives
Economic incentives occasionally have been another cause of un-
necessary Indian child removals. State welfare agencies have been ac-
supra note 3, at 355 (statement of Don Milligan); 1974 Hearings, supra note 13, at 56, 63
(statement of Drs. Carl Mindell and Alan Gurwitt). Other problems encountered in state
court child custody proceedings are not unique to Indian children. For example, many
caseworkers rely on whether a child looks "upset" when visited in a foster home by his or
her natural parents. Blanchard, The Question of Best Interest, in Unger, supra note 16, at 59.
Errors in interpreting this type of reaction can lead to the misplacement of Indian and non-
Indian children alike.
64. Frequent recourse to poverty as a reason for removal is a prime example. See gen-
erally 1977 Hearing, supra note 3, at 78 (statement of Goldie Denny); id. at 187 (statement of
Rena Uviller); 1974 Hearings, supra note 13, at 20 (statement of William Byler); id. at 117
(statement of Mel Sampson).
65. 503 P.2d 1050 (Alaska 1972).
66. Id. at 1054 n.8.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1053.
69. Id. at 1054.
70. Id. at 1055.
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cused of conditioning the availability of social services on Indian
parents' voluntary relinquishment of parental rights.71 Consequently,
many Indian families are fearful of seeking services that they are enti-
tled to by law.72 Although typically this has been a matter of local
administrative practice, federal laws may ultimately be responsible.
For example, state agencies managing federally subsidized state aid
programs have been encouraged to force able-bodied single parents to
take jobs; with the parent out of the house during the day, the children
are more vulnerable to removal on a theory of neglect.73 Furthermore,
federal programs have provided greater subsidization for foster care
than for the retention of children by their natural parents, making it
easier for children of poor families to be supported in substitute house-
holds.74 Indeed, the Bureau of Indian Affairs' foster home licensing
program, which has attempted to use Indian foster homes, has paid
significantly less foster care support than some private foster care agen-
cies, which have tended to place Indians in non-Indian homes.75
Another economic factor accelerating the removal of Indian chil-
dren has been growth in the private adoption market. In this era of
birth control and abortions there has been a decreasing supply of
healthy white children available for adoption. As a result, many par-
ents seeking to adopt have sought Indian children instead.76 Moreover,
as tribal members, these children often are entitled to annuities and
other per capita payments out of tribal funds, possibly making them
71. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, supra note 27, at 11; 1977 Hearing, supra note 3, at 141-42
(statement of Dr. Marlene Echohawk); Red Bird & Melendy, supra note 16, at 45.
72. 1977 Hearing, supra note 3, at 362 (statement of Don Milligan). See also 1974
Hearings, supra note 13, at 5 (statement of William Byler).
73. See general 1974 Hearings, supra note 13, at 95.
74. Cf. 1977Hearing, supra note 3, at 60-61 (statement of Nancy Amidel) (children too
often taken from their homes when supportive and preventative services might have allowed
them to stay with their families). This discrimination between foster and natural or adoptive
parents was challenged unsuccessfully in Ramos v. Montgomery, 313 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D.
Cal. 1970), aI'dmem., 400 U.S. 1003 (1971). A further federal incentive for removal of
Indian children was established by the enactment of the Child Abuse Prevention, and Treat-
ment and Adoption Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-266, 92 Stat. 205 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 42 U.S.C.). This statute was designed "to facilitate . . . interstate...
placement of children," S. REP. No. 95-167, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 557, 561, by streamlining placement procedures.
75. 1974 Hearings, supra note 13, at 157 (statement of Richard Lone Dog).
76. 1977 Hearing, supra note 13, at 359 (statement of Don Milligan, Washington State
Department of Social and Health Services). See also id. at 187 (statement of Rena Uviller);
1974 Hearings, supra note 13, at 5 (statement of William Byler); id. at 70 (statement of
Bertram Hirsch); id. at 116 (statement of Mel Sampson).
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even more attractive to some potential adoptors.
77
Procedural Problems
Many observers have blamed the frequency of Indian child re-
movals in part on procedural irregularities in state courts. Indian par-
ents, who often are ignorant of state procedures, 78 have not always
been notified of court dates.79 In DeCoteau v. District County Court,80 a
child was held in substitute care for seven months under an ex parte
"emergency" removal order. When a hearing finally was scheduled,
the mother was notified only by publication, although she had lived
continuously at the address from which the child originally had been
removed. This case is not unique.81 Procedural irregularities and er-
rors of this type that go undetected initially are especially serious be-
cause state appellate judges tend to believe subsequent reversals of
custody orders are not in the interest of the children involved. 82
Even when notified, Indian parents frequently have appeared
without representation. 83 Although tribes have an interest in these
matters and ordinarily have counsel of their own, typically they have
not been notified; even when aware of custody proceedings, tribes have
not been permitted to intervene. 84 As a result, the special cultural in-
terests of Indian children and their unique needs and resources tend
not to be presented to the courts.
Jurisdictional Conflicts
Since the foregoing criticisms of Indian child placement practices
77. Furthermore, these payments are not taxable. See 1974 Hearings, supra note 13, at
118, 121, 123 (statement of Mel Sampson).
78. See 1977 Hearing, supra note 3, at 115 (statement of Drs. Carl Mindell and Alan
Gurwitt); id. at 281 (statement of the Nez Perce Tribal Executive Committee); 1974 Hear-
ings, supra note 13, at 55 (statement of Drs. Carl Mindell and Alan Gurwitt).
79. See 1974 Hearings, supra note 13, at 8 (statement of William Byler).
80. 87 S.D. 555, 211 N.W.2d 843 (1973), aft'd, 420 U.S. 425 (1975). For a discussion of
the facts of the case, see 1974 Hearings, supra note 13, at 65-69 (statement of Cheryl
DeCoteau).
81. See, e.g., 1974 Hearings, supra note 13, at 21-23 (statement of William Byler); id. at
223-25 (statement of Mel Tonasket).
82. See 1977 Hearing, supra note 3, at 358 (statement of Don Milligan); Blanchard, The
Question of Best Interest, in Unger, supra note 16, at 59.
83. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, supra note 27, at 11; 1977 Hearing, supra note 4, at 281
(statement of Nez Perce Tribal Executive Committee); 1974 Hearings, supra note 13, at 56
(statement of Drs. Carl Mindell and Alan Gurwitt); Unger, supra note 16, at iii.
84. See 1976 REPORT, supra note 3, at 80; 1977Hearing, supra note 3, at 281 (statement
of Nez Perce Tribal Executive Committee); id. at 355 (statement of Don Milligan); Unger,
supra note 16, at iii.
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generally were directed at state agencies, the extent of state jurisdiction
over child placements may be the single most important factor in high
placement rates. In the past, there has been no clear rule delineating
the extent of state and tribal jurisdiction. Some states have exercised
jurisdiction over children residing on reservation lands; others have de-
ferred to tribal courts even in cases involving off-reservation children.85
The controversy was complicated in 1953 with the enactment of Public
Law 83-28086 (Public Law 280), requiring some states and authorizing
others to assume civil and criminal jurisdiction over reservations.
87
The earliest consideration of jurisdiction in Indian child custody
proceedings was in In re Lelah-Puc-Ka-Chee,88 decided in 1899. The
Indian agent for the Sac and Fox tribes of Iowa was anxious to enroll
Indian children in an off-reservation manual training school but had
been frustrated by parental resistance. He obtained legal guardianship
of all of the children from an Iowa state court and removed them from
their homes. The parents succeeded in obtaining habeas corpus for the
children's release. The Iowa federal district court concluded that only
courts of the United States could determine the custody of an Indian
85. See notes 94-100 infra.
86. Act of August 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 18, 28 U.S.C.) (amended by Indian Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 401-02,
82 Stat. 78-79 (1968) (codified in scattered sections of 18, 25, 28 U.S.C.)).
87. Section 4 of Public Law 280, as amended, conditionally offered states "jurisdiction
over civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are parties." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1360(a) (Supp. 111978). State "civil laws. . . of general application to private persons or
private property" were to have "the same force and effect" on affected reservations as else-
where under state control, id., preventing statutory discrimination against Indian communi-
ties. At the same time, no state law could tax or regulate the possession or use of property
held in trust for Indians by the United States, or reserved by treaty. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b)
(1976). Tribal legislation not inconsistent with states' general civil laws was to remain in
"full force and effect." Id. § 1360(c). Six states (Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska,
Oregon, and Wisconsin (with the exception of three named reservations)) were granted res-
ervation civil jurisdiction unilaterally and automatically. Id. § 1360(a). Other states were
authorized to assume jurisdiction, with or without tribal consent. Five states used this op-
tion to enter the field of Indian child welfare. Florida and Nevada (subsequently retro-
ceded) assumed full reservation civil jurisdiction. Idaho, Montana, and Washington
assumed reservation civil jurisdiction only of enumerated subjects, including juvenile delin-
quency, child abuse and neglect, and domestic relations. See general, AMERICAN INDIAN
POLICY REviEw COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT 201-02 (1977). Tribes have argued unsuccess-
fully that "partial assumption" of civil jurisdiction allows states to gain power while avoid-
ing responsibility and was not intended by the 83rd Congress. Washington v. Confederated
Tribes & Bands, 439 U.S. 463 (1979). Contests to Washington's compliance with Public Law
280 procedures also have been unsuccessful. E.g. Washington v. Confederated Bands &
Tribes, 440 U.S. 940 (1979); Comenout v. Burdman, 84 Wash. 2d 192, 525 P.2d 217 (1974).
See generally Goldberg, Public Law 280. The Limits of State Jurisdiction over Reservation
Indians, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rv. 535 (1975).
88. 98 F. 429 (N.D. Iowa 1899).
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child who resides on a reservation and whose tribal relations have not
been severed.
89
More recent decisions generally have recognized exclusive tribal
jurisdiction over the custody of Indian children actually residing within
a reservation9" or domiciled within a reservation but brought off-reser-
vation under a prior valid tribal custody order.9' Jurisdiction in these
cases cannot be delegated to state courts by a tribal court.92 When the
child is taken off-reservation by one or both of his or her parents for.the
89. Id. at 433. This did not end the matter. The Indian agent subsequently prosecuted
an adult member of the tribe for having helped some of the children escape from the board-
ing school. After his acquittal, the tribal member successfully sued the agent for false im-
prisonment. Peters v. Malin, 111 F. 244 (N.D. Iowa 1901).
90. In re Whiteshield, 124 N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1963) (adoption; all parties Indians resid-
ing within Devil's Lake Sioux reservation); In re Colwash, 57 Wash. 2d 196, 356 P.2d 994
(1960) (dependency petition brought by state agency involving abandoned child residing at
all times within Yakima reservation). Perhaps the greatest problem has been determining
when a child is "within" a reservation. Washington state courts have declined jurisdiction
over individual trust allotments not within the recognized boundaries of any reservation.
The General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887), and related special acts assigned
reservation lands to individual Indian families, issuing them patents "in trust" subject to the
continuing control of the United States. For some jurisdictional purposes these trust allot-
ments, located within extant or former reservations, must be distinguished from lands held
by the United States for the tribe as a whole. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (Supp. 11 1978)
(statutory definition of "Indian country"). See Washington v. Superior Court, 57 Wash. 2d
181, 356 P.2d 985 (1960) (abandoned children living at all times on off-reservation allot-
ments). South Dakota has exercised jurisdiction over trust allotments within a reservation
by applying a century-old homestead act. DeCoteau v. District Court, 87 S.D. 555, 211
N.W.2d 843 (1973), alt'd, 420 U.S. 425 (1975). The South Dakota Supreme Court found
that the "facts" of parental neglect had occurred about equally on trust allotments and on
fee lands, but avoided the problem of deciding which situs was controlling by concluding
that the reservation as a whole no longer existed. Id. at 557-61, 211 N.W.2d at 844-46. The
United States Supreme Court agreed in an opinion that wholly overlooked an eighty-year
history of legislative and administrative recognition of the tribal government after the date
of the federal act that allegedly terminated it.
Moreover, under Public Law 280, state child custody jurisdiction within an affected
reservation may not preclude concurrent tribal jurisdiction. The Act itself expressly saved
all tribal laws "not inconsistent with any applicable civil law of the State." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1360(c) (Supp. 11 1978), discussed in Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976). The
effect of this phrase remains debatable. See Goldberg, Public Law 280 The Limits ofState
Jurisdiction over Reservation Indians, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 535 (1975).
91. Wakefield v. Little Light, 276 Md. 333, 347 A.2d 228 (1975) (non-Indian foster
parents under Crow tribal court order seeking adoption in Maryland state court; no jurisdic-
tion); In re Adoption of Buehl, 87 Wash. 2d 649, 555 P.2d 1334 (1976) (non-Indian foster
parents under Blackfeet tribal court order seeking adoption in Washington state court after
tribal court revoked custody).
92. Blackwolf v. District Court, 158 Mont. 523, 493 P.2d 1293 (1972) (relying on Ken-
nerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971), to hold referral by tribal court to Montana state
court improper).
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purpose of surrendering the child to a state child welfare agency93 or to
litigate custody in a state forum,94 state courts generally have accepted
jurisdiction. State courts also have asserted jurisdiction over reserva-
tion-resident Indian children in some cases in which they have been
abandoned by their parents or removed from parental custody during
an off-reservation trip,95 reasoning that "the 'fact' of neglect . . . oc-
curred off the reservation. '96 In other cases, state courts have declined
to exercise jurisdiction over Indian children who, although residing for
some time off-reservation with their parents, once resided on a reserva-
tion and have maintained some social and institutional ties with it.
97
Both the situs of the facts upon which the change of custody is sought
and the residence of the child have been advanced as tests of jurisdic-
tion. This uncertainty makes it difficult to summarize state court juris-
diction over Indian children and creates inconsistencies nationwide in
the treatment of Indian children.
Congressional Response
A great variety of recommendations for protecting Indian children
and families reached Congress.98 Tribal witnesses were emphatic
93. In re Adoption of Doe, 89 N.M. 606, 555 P.2d 906 (1976). See Printz, Navajo
Grandparents-"Parent"or "Siranger'---Custody Determination, 9 N.M. L. REV. 187 (1978).
94. United States exrel. Cobell v. Cobell, 503 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1974) (modification of
custody decree in divorce, both Indian parents having originally agreed to a state forum). At
least some state courts will recognize a tribal court decree of divorce. E.g., In re Red Fox, 23
Or. App. 393, 542 P.2d 918 (1975).
95. In re Duryea, 115 Ariz. 86, 563 P.2d 885 (1977); In re Cantrell, 159 Mont. 66, 495
P.2d 179 (1972). Most of the children in these cases simply were abandoned while the par-
ents were travelling off-reservation, but one child involved in the Duryea appeal was placed
in foster care when her parents were jailed. 115 Ariz. at 87, 563 P.2d at 886.
96. In re Cantrell, 159 Mont. 66, 71, 495 P.2d 179, 182 (1972).
97. In Wisconsin Potowatomies v. Houston, 393 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Mich. 1973), a
custody contest between children's white maternal and Indian paternal relatives following
the death of both parents, the children had lived on the reservation and had continuing
contacts with the reservation. The court concluded they had remained domiciled on the
reservation notwithstanding residence elsewhere. Id. at 732. In In re Greybull, 23 Or. App.
674, 543 P.2d 1079 (1975), the court distinguished Wirconsin Potowatomies, noting that the
children had lived all their lives in Portland.
A second case involving Wisconsin Potowatomies also illustrates an important risk in
this type of case; in this case, while litigation was pending, Michigan authorities placed the
children with relatives in Florida, and the Florida district court blocked their return to the
successful Indian relatives. Wisconsin Potowatomies v. Wilsey, 377 F. Supp. 1153 (M.D.
Fla. 1974).
98. See, e.g., 1976 REPORT, supra note 3, at 87-88; 1977 Hearing, supra note 3, at 161
(statement of National Tribal Chairmen's Association); id. at 218 (statement of Don
Reeves); id. at 237 (statement of Alaska Legal Services Corporation); id. at 249-50 (state-
ment of Central Maine Indian Association, Inc.); id. at 258-60 (statement of Cheyenne River
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about the need for culturally appropriate family programs to provide
alternatives to removal. There was general agreement on authorizing
specialized federal funding through the Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare rather than the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 99 Further-
more, there was agreement that state participation in existing federal
funding should be conditioned on evidence of appropriate support
services and licensing criteria for Indian homes.'00 Recruitment of In-
dian professionals' 10 and eligibility for members of an Indian child's
extended family for financial support to provide temporary child care
also were recommended. 0 2 In 1977, the American Indian Policy Re-
view Commission introduced two additional recommendations of a
procedural nature: exclusive tribal child custody jurisdiction within
reservations 0 3 and state notification to tribes of off-reservation pro-
ceedings. 104 Because of stiff administration opposition to new funding
authorizations, 10 5 these procedural devices ultimately replaced funded
services as the major feature of the bill. 106
The identifiable causes of a problem dictate the nature of effective
solutions. Congress found that frequent unnecessary removals of In-
Sioux Tribe of South Dakota); 1974 Hearings, supra note 13, at 57 (statement of Drs. Carl
Mindell and Alan Gurwitt); id. at 328-29 (statement of North American Indian Women's
Association, Inc.).
99. 1977 Hearing, supra note 3, at 246 (statement of Mike Ranco, Central Maine In-
dian Association, Inc.); id. at 327-28 (statement of Beatrice Gentry); 1974 Hearings, supra
note 13, at 59 (statement of Drs. Carl Mindell and Alan Gurwitt).
100. 1976 REPORT, supra note 3, at 87-88; 1977 Hearing, supra note 3, at 287. It gener-
ally was agreed that Indian children should be placed, where possible, with Indian families,
1976 REPORT, supra note 3, at 87-88; 1974 Hearings, supra note 13, at 328-29 (statement of
North American Indian Women's Association), and that materialistic foster home licensing
criteria be eliminated. 1974 Hearings, supra note 13, at 328-29.
101. See 1974 Hearings, supra note 13, at 216 (statement of Evelyn Blanchard); id. at
328 (statement of North American Indian Women's Association).
102. Id. at 328.
103. See 1976 REPORT, supra note 3, at 87-88; 1977 Hearing, supra note 3, at 118-19
(statement of American Academy of Child Psychiatry); id. at 274-75 (statement of the
Yakima Indian Nation).
104. 1976 REPORT, supra note 3, at 87-88.
105. Both the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare went on record in opposition to the bill as unnecessarily costly and duplicative of
existing funding to state agencies. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, supra note 27, at 34; 1977Hear-
ing, supra note 3, at 50-65 (statement of Raymond Butler, Bureau of Indian Affairs). In
addition, the Justice Department feared the broad declaration of federal policy in the bill
would imply a legal obligation of the United States to bear the costs of tribal child welfare
programs. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, supra note 27, at 38 n.4, 40.
106. The original bill, S. 3777, was introduced in the 94th Congress and re-introduced as
S. 1214 in the 95th Congress. Subsequently, S. 1214 was amended to contain the complete
text of the House bill, H.R. 12533. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, supra note 27, at 28; see also S.
REP. No. 95-597, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1978).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 31
dian children had been the result of professional andjudicial attitudes
towards Indians, state judicial procedures, and the design and accessi-
bility offederal child wefare programs. State judicial procedures and
federal funding can be addressed by appropriate legislation. Optimisti-
cally, decisionmakers' attitudes can be altered by training. Conceiva-
bly, however, some of these attitudes can be avoided only by removing
the decision to another forum. It is in this light that the following dis-
cussion summarizes the legislation, as enacted, and critically analyzes
the Act and the regulations promulgated to implement its goals.
Scope of the Act
The key operational definitions in the Indian Child Welfare Act
are "child custody proceeding" and "Indian child." These two phrases
determine the general scope of the Act's safeguards. Unfortunately,
many of the problems that have been reported by Indian communities
do not qualify for Indian Child Welfare Act protection because they do
not involve child custody proceedings or Indian children as defined in
the Act.
"Child Custody Proceeding"
Under the Act, a child custody proceeding may be either a foster
care placement, a preadoptive placement, an adoption, or a termination
of parental rights.107 In all four categories, the common element is the
parents' loss of control over the child. Involuntary investigations and
home interventions by social welfare agencies implicitly are excluded.
Expressly excluded from the definition of child custody proceeding
are placements based on acts of a child that are essentially criminal in
nature,10 8 such as the institutionalization of a minor for theft or joyrid-
ing. Also expressly excluded are custody awards in divorce proceed-
ings. 09 Thus, the Indian Child Welfare Act does not disturb the power
of states to intervene in Indian homes as a preventive measure, to re-
move or institutionalize Indian children on grounds of juvenile delin-
quency, or to determine the custody of Indian children when their
parents seek a divorce. The Act principally applies to cases where a
state court attempts to remove an Indian child from his or her home on
grounds of the alleged incompetence or brutality of the parents.
107. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1) (Supp. I 1978), discussed in 44 Fed. Reg. 67,587-88 (1979).
108. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1) (Supp. 111978).
109. These exemptions are based on a recommendation by the Department of the Inte-
rior, which argued that additional procedural safeguards were necessary in these exempted
areas. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, supra note 27, at 31.
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This limited scope of applicability suggests that Congress may
have mistaken the real nature of the problems facing Indian families.
The preamble to the Act states that the purpose of the Act is "to pro-
mote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families.""' 0 To
achieve that purpose the target for legislation should have been the
general causes of Indian family breakups. Unquestionably, divorce is a
cause, and juvenile delinquency a symptom, of family disintegration.
The Act could have been much more effective in its stated purpose if
these types of proceedings had been included within the Act's protec-
tion.
Furthermore, prevention of family breakup necessitates tribal in-
tervention before removal of the child becomes imminent. A child be-
comes subject to the Act's provisions, however, only after being
removed from the home. Absent life-threatening conditions, effective
social welfare agencies monitor cases and offer supportive services for
weeks, months, or years before concluding that removal of a child is
unavoidable.' 1' It is during this preremoval period of investigation,
case planning, and family services that family breakup is prevented or
hastened. Once a case reaches the stage of proposed removal, breakup
of the family may be inevitable.
The Act addresses this problem only indirectly, by requiring a
showing prior to removing an Indian child from his or her home that
"active efforts have been made" to prevent family breakup." 12 This re-
quirement, however, does not mandate formal participation in case
planning by tribal or urban Indian social welfare agencies. Hence, tri-
bal input still need not be obtained during the critical preremoval pe-
riod. Moreover, state courts alone are left to determine whether efforts
to prevent family breakup have been "adequate." The result is a real
potential for uninformed decisions and inconsistent results. The Act
could have been far more effective if it had required sharing casework
responsibility with the tribe from the moment of inital state contact
with the family. Indian interests in preventing family disintegration
would have been protected more uniformly and the Act would have
encouraged a cooperative, rather than an adversarial, relationship be-
tween state and Indian caseworkers. The present system of crisis inter-
vention will do little to enable tribes to prevent child removals.' '3
110. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (Supp. 11 1978).
111. See notes 55-56 & accompanying text supra.
112. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (Supp. I 1978).
113. Public intervention in a family crisis ideally is a continuing process of evaluation,





The scope of the Indian Child Welfare Act is further restricted by
its definition of "Indian child." An "Indian child" is defined under the
Act as "any unmarried person under age eighteen" who is either "(a) a
member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an In-
dian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian
tribe." 114
This definition excludes a tribal member's biological child who is
not eligible for membership in that, or any other, tribe.' 15 The mini-
mum blood quantum requirement set forth in tribal constitutions was
insisted upon by the federal government to limit its service responsibili-
ties,1 6 and has the effect of denying membership to many children of
tribal members, regardless of a child's residence, language, cultural af-
filiation, or tribal allegiance. The Indian Child Welfare Act conforms
to this fifty year old policy by treating these "unenrollable" children as
non-Indians.
Difficulties with this exclusion may be illustrated by an example of
a tribal member with one-fourth Indian blood who resides on the reser-
ning" by participating agencies and professionals. When a child's life or health are not
imminently threatened, child welfare agency intervention may be limited to support services
designed to help the family overcome problems and function successfully. Support services
should include direct financial assistance, advocacy in obtaining assistance from other
sources, individual and family counseling, and respite (brief voluntary removal of a family
member while the crisis is being resolved). If support services fail, indefinite removal of the
child may be necessary, with or without parental consent. Removal of a child does not
terminate the case planning process. Especially in emergency situations, removals typically
are made to temporary receiving homes. An appropriate foster home must then be found.
Foster placements change frequently in the first six to eight weeks after removal, requiring
close supervision by the case planning team until some relatively stable arrangement is
achieved by the agencies involved or by final judicial decree.
114. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (Supp. 111978) (emphasis added). The question of whether the
decision of tribal agencies are conclusive as to eligibility is left unresolved by the Act.
115. See id. § 1901(3) (declaring Congress' interest to be limited to children who are
members of, or eligible for membership in, recognized tribes). This limitation was criticized
by the National Congress of American Indians. 1977 Hearing, supra note 3, at 128. See also
id. at 294 (statement of Phoenix Indian Center); id. at 327-28 (statement of Beatrice Gentry).
On the other hand, the National Tribal Chairmen's Association, American Civil Liberties
Union, and Department of Justice argued that the application of the Act even to enrolled
children would be unconstitutional unless restricted to those residing on a reservation or
maintaining "close family ties" to one. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, supra note 27 at 37-40; 1977
Hearing, supra note 3, at 158 (statement of the National Tribal Chairmen's Association); id.
at 189 (statement of the American Civil Liberties Union). The Act may yet be challenged on
that basis.
116. See R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, THE ROAD. INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIB-
ERTY 244-48 (1980).
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vation and is active in community affairs. Her first child, by a tribal
member also with one-fourth Indian blood, is enrollable in the tribe. If
she remarries another Indian, with only one-eighth Indian blood, her
second child is unenrollable. The Indian Child Welfare Act treats
these two children differently, even if raised in the same home, sharing
the same language and culture.
The Act also excludes children of "terminated" tribes, i e., tribes
not administratively recognized by the United States, and Canadian
tribes.117 The exclusion of Canadians will be a significant problem in
New England; Micmacs, from reserves in the maritime provinces, ac-
count for three-fourths of Indian child placement proceedings in the
greater Boston area.'
1 8
Admittedly, with limited resources, lines must be drawn and some
individuals and groups excluded from the Act's protection. The diffi-
cult question is where the lines should be drawn and by whom. The
Act makes an arbitrary exclusion based not on the aims and goals of
the legislation but on anachronistic and irrelevant classifications. The
purposes of the Act could have been better achieved by allowing many
of the exclusionary decisions to be made at the tribal level, based on a
number of factors, including, for example, the child's relative needs
and the tribe's available resources.
Alaska Natives
Some children of Alaska natives do not qualify as "Indian chil-
dren" under the Indian Child Welfare Act. Furthermore, the Act is
unclear as to which Alaska native children are covered and which are
not. To determine their status, one must read together the Act's defini-
tions of "Indian," "Indian tribe," and "Indian child." These three defi-
nitions, however, are both inconsistent and circular, and may lead to
anomalous results.
An Alaska Native child may be an Indian child under the Act if
117. Following enactment of Public Law 280, see note 86 supra, a number of tribal gov-
ernments were dissolved by Congress without tribal consent. Act of Jun. 14, 1954, Pub. L.
No. 83-399, 68 Stat. 250; Act of Aug. 23, 1954, Pub. L. Nos. 83-587, -588, -627, 68 Stat. 718,
724, 768; Act of Sept. 1, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-762, 68 Stat. 1099 (codified in 25 U.S.C.
§§ 741-760); Act of Aug. 1, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-887, 70 Stat. 893 (codified in 25 U.S.C.
§§ 791-807); Act of Aug. 2, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-921, 70 Stat. 937 (codified in 25 U.S.C.
§§ 821-826; Act of Aug. 3, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-943, 70 Stat. 963 (codified in 25 U.S.C.
§§ 841-853).
118. 1977 Hearing, supra note 3, at 242 (statement of Boston Indian Council, Inc.). See
also id. at 246-47 (statement of Mike Ranco, Central Maine Indian Association, Inc.); id. at
343-47 (statement of Indian Task Force of the Federal Regional Council of New England).
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that child is "a member of an Indian tribe." 9 An "Indian tribe," in
turn, is defined as any organized community of Indians recognized by
the Secretary of the Interior, "including any Alaska Native village."'
20
The question remains, however, whether the word "member," as used
here, refers to a shareholder in an Alaska Native village corporation
(organized under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act'
2'
(ANCSA)) or to an enrolled member of an Alaska Native Village (in-
corporated under the provisions of the 1934 Indian Reorganization
Act 22 (IRA)). Shareholdership and enrollment in a village are not sy-
nonymous. Not all IRA villages are ANCSA corporations and not all
ANCSA village corporations have IRA constitutions. The Act may en-
compass either type of membership, or both. The effect of this ambigu-
ity may be to exclude children from the Act's protection unnecessarily.
For example, suppose that "member of. . .or eligible for membership
in. . .any Alaska Native Village" is read to mean "shareholder in or
eligible for shareholdership in any ANCSA village corporation." Vil-
lage shares may be inherited like other personalty, hence a legal heir of
a living shareholder is "eligible for shareholdership" and would be
considered a member under the Act. If such a child is disinherited,
however, the child could be deprived of shareholdership by reason of
events that normally would not terminate tribal membership. The re-
sult could be unjustified exclusion from the scope of the Act.
Just as the native child of an Alaska Native might not be consid-
ered an "Indian child" under this interpretation, a non-Native child
could be considered an "Indian child" and qualify for the Act's protec-
tion. After 1991, anyone may buy and vote village shares. 23 Village
shareholders after that date may include non-Natives. Consequently,
children of these shareholders could be "Indian children" under the
Indian Child Welfare Act.
It is not enough under the Act, however, for a child to be eligible
for membership in a tribe or village; the child also must be "the biolog-
ical child of an Indian."124 The Act defines "Indian" as "a member of
119. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (Supp. 11 1978).
120. Id. § 1903(8).
121. See Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, §§ 8(a), 11(b), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1607(a),
1610(b) (1976).
122. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1976). Forty-eight Alaska Native villages had adopted Indian
Reorganization Act constitutions by 1946. Haas, Ten Years of Tribal Government Under
ZR.A., I TRIBAL RELATIONS PAMPHLETS 29-30 (United States Indian Service 1947).
123. See Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, §§ 7(h), 8(c), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1606(h),
1607(c) (1976).
124. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (1976).
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an Indian tribe or. . . an Alaska Native and a member of a Regional
Corporation."125 Reading this together with the Act's definition of "In-
dian tribe," it appears that an "Indian child" must be the biological
child of a member of a village (as defined by either ANCSA or IRA) or
of an Alaska Native member of a regional corporation. Because a non-
Native can be a shareholder of an ANCSA village after 1991, as dis-
cussed, the biological child of a non-Native may, in fact, come under
the Act's protection.
A further problem arises because a "member of a Regional Corpo-
ration" must be a shareholder, and an Alaska Native born after 1971
can become a regional or village shareholder only by inheritance or
purchase. 126 Therefore, the children of Alaska Natives born after 1971
would not be considered the biological children of an Indian, for the
purposes of the Act, until their parents purchase or inherit shares in the
village corporation.
These conflicts among the Act's many overlapping definitions of
"Indian child" are caused by ambiguity in the statutory wording. Clar-
ification of the Act's applicability is essential if unreasonable and un-
fortunate results are to be avoided.
Exclusive Tribal Jurisdiction
Congress typically leaves the delineation of tribal powers and ju-
risdiction to the courts. 12 7 The Indian Child Welfare Act breaks with
this tradition. Although it was intended to confirm prior case law,
128
the Act actually may narrow the scope of exclusive tribal child welfare
jurisdiction.
The Act confirms exclusive tribal jurisdiction only over "child cus-
tody proceedings."' 129 By implication, jurisdiction over juvenile delin-
quency proceedings, divorce, and investigative and preventive actions
taken by social welfare agencies is at best concurrent with state jurisdic-
tions, even where these actions occur totally within the reservation. Al-
though this implication does not follow necessarily from the Act, it is a
125. Id. § 1903(3) (1976) (emphasis added). The term "Alaska Native" is not defined by
the Indian Child Welfare Act. The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, § 5, 43 U.S.C.
§ 1604 (1976), established a permanent roll of Alaska Natives living in 1971.
126. See authorities cited note 122 supra.
127. R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, THE ROAD. INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIBERTY
137-40 (1980).
128. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, supra note 27, at 21.
129. Tribal jurisdiction was the subject in United States ex. rel. Cobell v. Cobell, 503
F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1974) (divorce), and Blackwolf v. District Court, 158 Mont. 523, 493 P.2d
1293 (1972) (juvenile delinquency). Both cases ruled that the state courts lacked jurisdiction.
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plausible enough interpretation, and may invite fresh state challenges
to the jurisdiction of tribal courts.
130
Ordinarily, a state can exercise child protective jurisdiction over
any child found within its borders, subject only to the continuing juris-
diction of the courts of other states. '1 The Indian Child Welfare Act
confirms exclusive tribal child welfare jurisdiction over Indian children
who are "wards" of a tribal court or "who reside or are domiciled" on
the tribe's reservation. 32 This extends the tribes' reach to domiciliaries
found off-reservation. On the other hand, an Indian family could not,
under the Act, avoid state law by bringing a child to the reservation
solely to allow the tribal court to order a new child placement.
This poses a problem where an Indian parent takes a child off-
reservation and, subsequently, through the parent's neglect or inability
to care adequately for the child, the child's on-reservation extended
family brings the child back and tries to establish custody. In many
states the domicile of the child is the domicile of the parent or legal
guardian. 133 If the extended family retrieves a child from an off-reser-
vation parent, the state is likely to continue to treat the child as domi-
ciled off-reservation. Consequently, the Indian Child Welfare Act
would support exclusive state jurisdiction, despite the possibility that in
at least some cases a more appropriate determination could be made in
the tribal court.
Congress, aware that exclusive tribal jurisdiction would be mean-
ingless without interstate recognition and enforcement, included a pro-
vision in the Act to require state court recognition of tribal child
custody judgments. 34 The meaning of the provision, however, is
somewhat ambiguous; the United States, states, territories, and tribes
are to give full faith and credit to tribal child custody proceedings and
laws "to the same extent that such entitites give full faith and credit to
the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of any other entity." 1
35
130. In any event, it is clear that a tribe which lost exclusive jurisdiction of child custody
matters under some prior federal law can reassume jurisdiction only over "child custody
proceedings" as restrictively defined by the Indian Child Welfare Act. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d)
(Supp. 11 1978); 44 Fed. Reg. 45,093-94 (1979).
131. B. Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and
Remaining Problems, 65 CALIF. L. REv. 978, 981-85 (1977); B. Bodenheimer, The Uniform
Child Custody Act: A Legislative Remedyfor Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22
VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1224-29 (1969).
132. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (Supp. if 1978).
133. 25 AM. JUR. 2d Domicile § 64 (1966); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 8 (1969).
134. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) (Supp. II1978).
135. Id. (emphasis added).
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Although the provision mentions full faith and credit, it does not ex-
pressly state that tribal judgments are to be accorded the same weight
as other state court judgments. The phrase "any other entity" could be
misinterpreted to allow application of a supremacy or comity standard.
Although the likelihood of misinterpretation may be insignificant, indi-
vidual court decisions may not be consistent, creating a potential for
lack of uniformity. Confusion could have been avoided by an express
statement that tribal judgments are to be accorded the same recognition
as state court judgments.
The Indian Child Welfare Act also confirms the effect of Public
Law 280,136 i e., granting some states concurrent and superior jurisdic-
tion over reservations located within their boundaries. To reacquire
this lost jurisdiction over child custody proceedings, tribes must peti-
tion the Secretary of the Interior, who has unlimited discretion to deny
the petition. 137 The Act suggests factors that the Secretary may con-
sider, but provides no reviewable standards. Two of the factors sug-
gested in the Act, the territorial area and population of the tribe,'
38
indicate that small tribes may be discriminated against notwithstanding
their ability to exercise reassumed jurisdiction effectively. It would
have been more appropriate for Congress to advise the Secretary not to
consider the size of the tribe, but its financial and technical resources.
Unfortunately, as written, the Act may deny the reassumption of juris-
diction by capable and qualified tribes.'
39
Notice and Intervention in State Proceedings
The Indian Child Welfare Act guarantees the right of an Indian
child's parents or tribe to intervene at any point in specified state child
custody proceedings. 40 This right of intervention appears not to apply,
136. See note 86 supra.
137. 25 U.S.C. § 1918(b) (Supp. 11 1978).
138. Id. § 1918(b)(ii), (iii).
139. The Indian Child Welfare Act's provision for reassumption is its only remedy for
the problem of concurrent civil jurisdiction under Public Law 280. See note 86 supra. As
long as both the tribe and the state assert concurrent child protective jurisdiction, the out-
come of a child custody contest may depend on a "race to the courthouse." Rather than
declare as a general matter whether state Public Law 280 jurisdiction is exclusive or concur-
rent, resolving the controversy in the case law, the Act simply leaves it to dissatisfied tribes to
take action individually.
140. 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (c) (Supp. I 1978). In response to fears expressed at the hearings,
the Act's procedural requirements were drafted in language intended to avoid any implica-
tion of applicability to proceedings in tribal courts. See 1977 Hearing, supra note 3, at 78
(statement of Goldie Denny); id. at 138 (statement of Marlene Echohawk); id. at 185 (state-
ment of Rena Uviller).
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however, to voluntary actions.141 Nonetheless, the Indian child's tribe
should be entitled to intervene in voluntary adoptions. Given that the
tribe's participation in an involuntary placement is desirable to assure
the best possible placement for an Indian child, there is no apparent
reason to distinguish voluntary proceedings. Simply because an Indian
parent gives up a child willingly to a state or private agency does not
mean that the agency will do a better job of placing that child in an
appropriate home.'
42
The right to intervene would be of little value without notice of
pending proceedings. The duty of giving notice under the Act falls on
the party seeking custody, ordinarily a state agency. Under the Act, the
rights of notice and intervention extend to "the parent or Indian custo-
dian and the Indian child's tribe."'143 The Act's definition of "Indian
child's tribe" allows the child to have only one tribe. 44 If a child is a
member, or is eligible for membership, in more than one tribe, that
child is treated as a member of the tribe with which he or she has
"more significant contacts."' 145 Therefore, in a proceeding involving a
multi-tribal Indian child, the party seeking custody only need notify
the tribe with the more significant contacts. The Act, however, fails to
define "significant contacts," so that the party seeking custody must de-
termine alone which tribe to notify. Evaluation of "significant con-
tacts" thus becomes a threshold question to be determined by private
parties before any of the potentially affected tribes have had an oppor-
tunity to appear.' 46 This problem is compounded by the likelihood
that a potentially affected tribe will be entirely unaware of the proceed-
ings; a tribe cannot challenge lack of notice unless it learns of the pro-
ceeding by some other means. 1
47
141. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1911(c), 1912(a) (Supp. II 1978).
142. Voluntary adoptions may account for as many as one-third of the total number of
adoptions. 1977Hearing, supra note 3, at 356-59. The National Congress of American Indi-
ans raised this point unsuccessfully in an attempt to expand the tribes' right of intervention.
Id. at 136. Voluntary actions may have been exempted from the Act because of vigorous
lobbying by the Mormon church, which feared complications for its educational placement
program, id. at 192-216, 431-74, which was strongly criticized by the tribes. Id. at 219, 250.
143. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (Supp. II 1978). The Act defines "Indian custodian" as a par-
ent or Indian legal guardian. Id. § 1903(6). Similarly, "parent" is defined as a biological
parent or an Indian person who lawfully adopts an Indian child. Id. § 1903(9).
144. Id. § 1903(5).
145. Id.
146. "It is assumed that the appropriate official can make a reasonable judgment about
which Indian tribe the Indian child has the more significant contacts [sic]." H.R. REP. No.
95-1386, supra note 27, at 20.
147. A hypothetical situation will illustrate the point. Suppose a child is eligible for
enrollment in Tribe .4 and Tribe B. Tribe.4 is nearby, has an active interest in the child and
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Clearly, jurisdiction over a child custody proceeding cannot be
transferred to more than one tribe at a time. Although a single eligible
transferee tribe must be identified in each case, there is no compelling
reason why all tribes with an interest in a child should not be entitled to
notice of the proceeding and be given an opportunity to intervene on
the child's behalf. Rather than the limited and exclusionary "signifi-
cant contacts" test, Congress could have required notification of all
tribes having minimum contacts with the child, thereby increasing the
likelihood of tribal participation in the proceeding.
The right to intervene also is virtually meaningless unless notice of
proceedings is prompt and reliable and unless placements that have
been made without adequate notice can be reversed. The Act expressly
provides for reversal. If denied notice or the opportunity to intervene,
the child's parent or tribe may petition for new proceedings. 148 For the
welfare of the child, however, problems should be avoided before a
placement has been made.
The party seeking custody must "notify the parent or Indian custo-
dian and the Indian child's tribe, by registered mail with return receipt
requested."' 149 If the "identity or location of the parent or Indian cus-
todian and the tribe cannot be determined,"' 150 the party seeking cus-
tody must notify the Secretary of the Interior.15' Strictly construed,
however, the Secretary need be notified only when the part seeking cus-
tody can identify neither the legal guardian nor the tribe. If that party
does not know the address of the child's tribe, then it lawfully may
notify the parents alone. The Act would have been more effective at
insuring the participation of all concerned if it required that the Secre-
tary be notified whenever the identity of the parent, the Indian custo-
dian, or the tribe "cannot be determined."
Additional problems arise in working out the impact of the notice
provisions on the custody proceeding itself. To protect the rights of
parents and tribes, the Act prohibits holding a child custody proceeding
until "at least ten days after receipt of notice by the parent or Indian
facilities to provide support, but the state agency determines that Tribe B has the more
significant contacts. If only Tribe B is notified, and then declines to intervene, Tribe .4 may
receive no notice of the proceeding despite the benefits available to the child from its inter-
vention.
148. 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (Supp. 11 1978).
149. Id. § 1912(a).
150. Id. (emphasis added). The House Committee read this phrase as meaning "Indian
custodian or the tribe." H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, supra note 27, at 21.
151. 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (Supp. 11 1978).
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custodian and the tribe or Secretary."'152 This ambiguous phrase may
lead to interesting problems if it is interpreted to mean, as Congress
probably intended, that the proceedings not begin until all parties have
had notice for ten days. If, ten days after the parents in a child custody
proceeding have acknowledged receipt of notice the tribe has not ac-
knowledged notice, what is the court to do?153 Furthermore, the Act
implies that parties seeking custody may notify either the parents or the
tribe, if only one can be identified. The state courts, on the other hand,
apparently cannot proceed unless both the parents and the tribe have
received notice.
This problem may encourage state agencies to avoid notifying par-
ents and tribes by routinely sending notice to the Secretary. Once noti-
fied, the Secretary has only fifteen days to identify, locate, and notify
"the parent or Indian custodian and the tribe."'154 This limited time
and the lack of any funding for this additional responsibility 155 may
mean that parental and tribal input will be avoided. Indeed, even if the
Secretary makes the required "diligent efforts to relay such notice,"156 a
state court need only wait ten days after the Secretary receives notice to
begin proceedings. Hence, the child may be placed or adopted before
the Secretary's fifteen day period to notify the parents or the tribe has
elapsed. 157
152. Id. § 1912(a). The Department of the Interior succeeded in getting this time limit
reduced from 30 days. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, supra note 27, at 32. Presumably this
poorly-punctuated phrase was intended to mean "receipt of notice by the parent or Indian
custodian and the tribe [,] or by the Secretary."
153. The regulations avoid this problem by use of the disjunctive "or" rather than the
conjunctive "and," 44 Fed. Reg. 45,096, 45,103 (1979) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R.
§ 23.11 (a)), as do the suggested "guidelines" for state courts, id. at 67,584, 67,588.
154. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (Supp. 11 1978) (emphasis added).
155. This is significant in light of past criticism of the Bureau of Indian Affairs' manage-
ment of Indian child welfare services, and recommendations that the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare be given oversight of any new programs. See note 99 supra. See
also 1977 Hearing, supra note 3, at 104-05, 109 (statement of Virginia Bausch).
156. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, supra note 27, at 21.
157. Section 104 of the Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (Supp. 111978), permits reversal of place-
ments made in violation of its provisions for notice, but routine notification of the Secretary
is not, strictly speaking, a violation. A case might be made that the child's parents and tribe
were identifiable and therefore should have been notified directly. However, proving that a
state or private agency knew, or should have known, of the identity and whereabouts of the
parents and tribe would be difficult. To further complicate matters, the Act also may be
interpreted as requiring notice and delay of proceedings each time an Indian child is moved
from one placement to another. Ifa child must be moved several times during the pendency
of court proceedings, there is a danger of indefinitely postponing final disposition of a case.
It also would be possible for agencies to frustrate the Act by deliberately moving Indian
children to force postponements. States and tribes could try to resolve this problem by
agreeing to waive the statutory delay (but not the requirement of notice) for secondary
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Transfers of Proceedings to Tribal Court
Eligible Children
Notice is important, in part, because an intervening parent or tribe
can petition the state court to transfer the proceeding to a tribal
court. 58 This right is limited, however, to proceedings involving "an
Indian child not domiciled or residing within the reservation of the In-
dian child's tribe."'
159
An Indian child who resides on a reservation ordinarily would be
subject to exclusive tribal jurisdiction. 160 States, on the other hand,
have exclusive jurisdiction over children that do not reside on a reser-
vation and children who reside on a reservation subject to Public Law
280.161 The Indian Child Welfare Act makes all proceedings involving
children in the former group transferable, but excepts out of the latter
group children who are members of a particular tribe but reside on
another tribe's reservation, e.g., a child enrolled in the mother's tribe
but living on the father's reservation.
A hypothetical case illustrates the problem. Two children, A and
.B, are members of Tribe X, a Public Law 280 tribe in Washington. A
lives on the reservation of Tribe S; B lives in Chicago. In a state pro-
ceeding in Illinois, B can be transferred to the courts of Tribe X. In a
state proceeding in Washington; however, A cannot be transferred to
the courts of Tribe X. Ironically, in cases like this, the Indian Child
Welfare Act gives Public Law 280 tribes a greater interest in their off-
reservation children. Apparently, the drafters of the Act did not fully
consider the territorial implications of this provision. Confusion could
have been avoided simply by stating that where tribal jurisdiction is not
exclusive, jurisdiction may, nonetheless, be transferred to the tribe.
Denial of Petition for Transfer
An otherwise proper petition for transfer involving an eligible In-
dian child and an eligible tribal court may be denied if either of the
placements pending final court action. Such agreements might not survive challenge by
aggrieved Indian parents, however.
158. Id. § 1911(b).
159. Id.
160. Id. § 191 l(a). The Act's definition of "reservation," id. § 1903(10), includes all fee
lands within a reservation, and all trust allotments wherever located, deliberately reversing
the result in DeCoteau v. District Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975). H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, supra
note 27, at 21.
161. See note 86 & accompanying text supra.
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parents 62 or the tribe objects, or if the state court finds "good cause"
not to make the transfer.' 63 These limitations could operate to frustrate
many proposed transfers.
Obviously, the proposed transferee tribe must be given an oppor-
tunity to object. Many tribes lack the interest or resources to place and
support foster care children. Because the party seeking custody effec-
tively chooses the eligible transferee by determining the "Indian child's
tribe" for notice purposes, 64 however, there is a considerable potential
to have uninterested transferees deliberately selected, who then will ob-
ject. Problems also arise from the Act's failure to specifiy how long a
state court must wait before concluding that a proposed transfer has
not been accepted by the tribe. 65 A state court might require a written
response from the tribe within an unreasonably short period of time
after having received notice. The practical effect would be to inhibit or
defeat a tribe's opportunity to accept.
Either parent, Indian or non-Indian, may veto a proposed transfer
regardless of the opinion of the tribe or the state social service agency.
Whenever there is parental disagreement over the proper forum, state
courts thus will prevail. Given the goals of the Act, a presumption in
favor of tribal jurisdiction would have been preferable to this effective
presumption for state court jurisdiction. Moreover, the state court itself
may veto a transfer to a tribal court for "good cause." The Act does
not define this term and hence leaves to the discretion of state trial
162. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (Supp. 111978). This limitation was recommended by the Na-
tional Tribal Chairmen's Association. 1977 Hearing, supra note 3, at 158 (statement of Cal-
vin Isaac). The Department of the Interior further recommended that any child over the age
of twelve years be able to object to transfer. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, supra note 27, at 32.
Although this was not included in the Act, the Department of the Interior inserted it in the
guidelines for state courts. 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584, 67,591 (1979).
163. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (Supp. 111978). This is consistent with the House Committee's
contention, H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, supra note 27, at 21, that this provision of the Act is
merely "a modified doctrine of forum non conveniens." See also id. at 40. As was noted in
the Senate Report: "Good cause" was intended to preserve the state courts' "flexibility." S.
REP. No. 95-597, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1978).
164. See notes 143-46 & accompanying text supra. With respect to transfers of jurisdic-
tion some states that have adopted Public Law 280 maintain the statute grants exclusive
child welfare jurisdiction on reservations. 25 U.S.C. § 1322 (1976). It remains unresolved
whether a tribe in a Public Law 280 state that lacked any subject matter jurisdiction over
child custody proceedings prior to the Act now has sufficient subject matter jurisdiction to
accept a transfer of jurisdiction. The Act saves prior state authority under Public Law 280,
id. § 1911(b) (Supp. I 1978), and there is legislative history to the effect that tribes gain no
jurisdiction under the Act except by reassumption. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, supra note
27, at 31-32.
165. The Department of the Interior suggests that state courts give tribes at least twenty
days. 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584, 67,592 (1979).
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judges the decision to transfer a proceeding. Judges opposed to trans-
fers to tribal courts in general are unlikely to relinquish state court ju-
risdiction. Ironically, the Act, which was to remove Indian children
from the hands of state judges who "often failed to recognize the essen-
tial tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and social stan-
dards prevailing in Indian communities and families,"' 166 places the
remedy, transfer to tribal courts, in the virtually unlimited discretion of
state judges. This potential problem might have been prevented by in-
cluding a short, clear list of criteria for denying transfer and by creating
a presumption in favor of tribal jurisdiction rather than against it.
Emergency Placements
Once an Indian child has been placed in a foster care or adoptive
home, any subsequent change of placement must follow the Act's no-
tice and transfer procedures.167 There is a loophole, however, permit-
ting "emergency" removal of Indian children from Indian homes
without meeting the notice or transfer requirements. While true emer-
gency situations may well require some streamlined removal proce-
dures, the Act fails to limit these procedures sufficiently to protect
parental and tribal interests. Emergency placements "to prevent immi-
nent physical damage or harm to the child"'' 68 may be made by agen-
cies on their own authority, without notice to the Indian child's tribe,
and may last until the state agency determines that the removal is no
longer necessary.' 69 The Act contains no time limit on when the state
agency must commence a child custody proceeding with the concomi-
tant safeguards of notice, intervention, and transfer.
The Act's provision on emergency placements apparently is lim-
ited to cases involving "an Indian child who is a resident of or is
domiciled on a reservation, but temporarily located off the reserva-
tion."' 70 Strictly construed, the Act's emergency removal provision ap-
parently does not cover Indian children domiciled off the reservation.
Although this distinction probably was not intended by the drafters of
166. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (Supp. 11 1978).
167. Id. § 1916.
168. Id. § 1922. This provision was criticized by the American Civil Liberties Union,
1977Hearing, supra note 4, at 184, 381-83, and by the Department of the Interior, H.R. REP.
No. 95-1386, supra note 27, at 32, which suggested a 72-hour limit. The House Committee
assumed state agencies could be trusted to keep emergency removals to "a reasonable length
of time." Id. at 25.
169. 25 U.S.C. § 1922 (Supp. 11 1978).
170. Id. (emphasis added).
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the section, the ambiguous language could severely restrict the reach of
the emergency placement provision.
Standards of Proof and Placement Preferences
Many Indian child custody proceedings will continue to be heard
in state courts. The Act therefore attempts to protect Indian families by
establishing stricter standards for the removal of children and for the
choice of alternative placements. The Act's standards, however, are
often vague and may be circumvented easily.
Initially, removal of an Indian child is not to be authorized by a
state court unless the judge is satisfied that "active efforts have been
made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs
designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these
efforts have proved unsuccessful." 17 ' This standard is likely to prove
no real barrier to removal, however, given that Congress has found that
state programs have been inadequate and ineffective, and that state so-
cial workers and judges often are ignorant of, or biased against, Indian
family values.
In assessing the need for removal, the dispositive question under
the Act is whether remaining in the home "is likely to result in serious
emotional or physical damage to the child." 172 This is to be proved by
"clear and convincing evidence" in the case of foster care placement
73
and "beyond a reasonable doubt" in the case of termination of parental
rights.174 Although both of these standards are familiar legal terms of
art, they are likely to be of limited usefulness in child custody proceed-
ings.175 Much of the testimony in these proceedings will consist of the
opinions and judgments of physicians, psychologists, and social work-
ers, making it extremely difficult to develop any consistency in the ap-
plication of the standards of proof. Moreover, appellate courts
traditionally have deferred to trial court discretion in applying these
standards. Thus, although the Act's standards may increase the fre-
171. Id. § 1912(d).
172. Id. § 1912(e).
173. Id.
174. Id. § 1912(f). "[Tlhe committee feels that the removal of a child from the parents is
a penalty as great, if not greater, than a criminal penalty." H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, Supra
note 27, at 22.
175. The bill originally provided for "overwhelming evidence," but Navajo legal serv-
ices lawyers suggested "clear and convincing" would be less vague and more familiar to
judges. 1977 Hearing, supra note 3, at 278, 295 (statements of Eric Eberhard, Syd Beaune,
and Ruth Houghton). The Department of the Interior thought even "clear and convincing"
too high a standard. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, supra note 27, at 32-33.
July 19801
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
quency of appeals, it is doubtful that the judgment of many trial court
judges will be disturbed by higher courts.
In child custody cases, state court judges are likely to rely heavily
on expert testimony. Therefore, the quality of expert testimony and the
cultural background of the experts are more important than the quan-
tum of proof. The Act directs state courts to seek the opinions of
"qualified expert witnesses,"' 176 without further definition. Since one of
the underlying premises of the Act is that state courts have generally
misunderstood Indian cultural and family organization, 77 Congress
should have made the cultural and sociological testimony of tribal
members and tribal professionals an essential element of the proceed-
ings. As the Act now reads, it allows state courts to consider the testi-
mony of anthropologists, social caseworkers, and sociologists in
establishing tribal kinship and childrearing patterns, without con-
fronting the experts of the tribe itself.'
78
Once the decision to remove a child has been made, a suitable
home must be found. Generally, the Act gives first preference to other
members of the child's "extended family,"' 79 then to other families in
the child's tribe, and last to other Indian homes and institutions.' 80 A
state court can circumvent these preferences, however, by finding
"good cause to the contrary."' 8' This undefined phrase allows state
court judges to exercise broad discretion to continue prior practices.
Judges who previously applied culturally inappropriate standards to
Indian child placements and who therefore were the targets of the Act,
may, under the guise of "good cause," continue to apply inappropriate
standards.
The Act empowers tribes to establish by resolution their own pref-
erences for state-ordered child placements, and state courts are directed
to follow tribally-established preferences as long as they result in "the
176. 25 U.SC. § 1912(e)-(f) (Supp. 11 1978). This means "expertise beyond the normal
social worker qualifications." H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, supra note 27, at 22.
177. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (Supp. 11 1978).
178. The possible exclusion of laymen was criticized in the hearings. 1977 Hearing,
supra note 3, at 295 (statements of Syd Beaune and Ruth Houghton). The Secretary of the
Interior has released a regulation on this matter. See notes 242-43 & accompanying text
infra.
179. "Extended family" is to be defined by tribal law and custom, 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2)
(Supp. 11 1978), and might include non-Indian relatives. 1977 Hearing, supra note 3, at 160
(statement of Calvin Isaac). It is unclear whether tribal court decisions or the testimony of
tribal members will be conclusive, or whether state judges will resort instead to "expert"
anthropological reports which may be in conflict with tribal views.
180. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a)-(b) (Supp. 11 1978).
181. -d.
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least restrictive setting appropriate to the particular needs of the
child." 82 Although state courts are advised to respect "the, prevailing
social and cultural standards of the child's Indian community" in mak-
ing such judgments,'8 3 "least restrictive setting," like "good cause," is
discretionary and may be too vague a standard for effective appellate
review.
Although it establishes placement standards that are compatible
with Indian goals, the Act leaves state courts relatively free to choose
whether or not to follow them. Thus, the opinions of state court judges
as to what is best for the child in individual child custody proceedings
ultimately may take precedence over both the preferences set forth in
the Act and any preferences legislated by the tribes.
Special Rights of Parents
Parent
Throughout the Act, the phrase "parent or Indian custodian" is
used to identify individuals who are entitled to notice, intervention,
and the right to petition for the invalidation of proceedings. 84 An "In-
dian custodian" under the Act is any Indian who has legal custody of
the child through tribal law or custom or "to whom temporary physical
care, custody, and control have been transferred by the parent."'18 5
This definition is broad enough to include the Indian representative of
a child placement agency who obtains the child temporarily or under
duress. The Act speaks of "transfer" but not of voluntary transfer or of
the purpose of the transfer. In principle, an Indian caseworker, with
only temporary custody of an Indian child, can be the beneficiary of
the Act's provisions for notice and intervention.
86
A "parent" is defined as "any biological parent or parents of an
Indian child" or an Indian adoptive parent of an Indian child. 187 A
non-Indian, therefore, can be the parent of an Indian child through
birth, but not through adoption. If an Indian woman marries a non-
182. Id. § 1915(c). This section was suggested by the National Tribal Chairmen's Asso-
ciation. 1977 Hearing, supra note 3, at 159-60, 258-59.
183. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(c) (Supp. I 1978). The House Committee felt this would suffice
to end the application of "white, middle-class values" to child placement decisions. H.R.
REP. No. 95-1386, supra note 27, at 24. This section does not apply explicitly to foster
homes licensing, however.
184. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1911(c), 1912(a), 1914 (Supp. 11 1978).
185. Id. § 1903(6).
186. The Act directs notice to the "parent or Indian custodian" in the alternative. Id.
§ 1912(a) (emphasis added).
187. Id. § 1903(9).
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Indian and they have a child, the non-Indian man is a parent under the
Indian Child Welfare Act. If the non-Indian father subsequently dies
and the woman remarries another non-Indian, this second spouse is noi
considered a parent under the Act and cannot become the child's "In-
dian custodian," even after his wife's death. He has no rights under the
Act and he cannot protect the interests of the child.188 This discrimina-
tion can lead to serious and unfortunate consequences.
Court-Appointed Counsel
Parents and Indian custodians are given the right to court-ap-
pointed counsel if they cannot afford counsel of their own. 189 If the
appointment and payment of counsel in such cases is not already pro-
vided for by state law, the Secretary of the Interior, "upon certification
of the presiding [state] judge, shall pay reasonable fees and ex-
penses." 90 However, no special appropriations for this purpose are au-
thorized by the Act. The Secretary is to draw on general
appropriations for Indian welfare authorized by the 1921 Snyder
Act. 191 Furthermore, use of the phrase "'reasonable fees" indicates that
there is some discretion on the part of the Secretary to approve or
otherwise regulate counsel fees. Consequently, with little money avail-
able and the possibility of arbitrary rulings on the reasonableness of
fees, attorneys may be extremely hesitant to accept appointment in
these cases.
"Higher Standards of Protection"
The Indian Child Welfare Act cautiously provides that whenever
"State or Federal law applicable to a child custody proceeding .. .
provides a higher standard of protection to the rights of the parent or
Indian custodian of an Indian child than the rights provided under this
[Act], the State or Federal Court shall apply the State or Federal stan-
dard."' 9 2 The Act does not specify what constitutes a "higher stan-
188. Because the Act directs notice to the "parent or Indian custodian," problems also
may arise when there are two parents, separated perhaps, and an Indian custodian. All have
an interest, but it is not clear which of them must be notified before state proceedings can
lawfully begin.
189. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(b) (Supp. 11 1978). The state court in its discretion also may ap-
point counsel for the child. Both the National Congress of American Indians and Depart-
ment of the Interior, however, opposed affording Indian children a right to court-appointed
counsel. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, supra note 27, at 32; 1977 Hearing, supra note 3, at 144.
190. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(b) (Supp. 11 1978).
191. Id. See note 37 supra.
192. 25 U.S.C. § 1921 (Supp. 11 1978).
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dard" of protection, a decision that often depends on one's point of
view. 193 Although this provision of the Act probably was meant to al-
low Indian parents to argue under whichever law they preferred, it pro-
vides broad discretion for the courts to continue to apply state
standards to Indian child custody proceedings.
Enforcement and Implementation
Standards are meaningless unless enforced. Consequently, failure
to apply statutory standards must be either reversible, punishable, or
both. Furthermore, all parties must be aware of the right to invoke the
remedies provided by law to insure a statute's effectiveness.
The Indian Child Welfare Act authorizes the parent, child, or tribe
to "petition any court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate" a child
custody proceeding that violates the Act's provisions on exclusive tribal
jurisdiction, transfer, notice, rights of intervention, consent to adoption,
or standards of proof. 94 The implication is that the Act bars invalida-
tion of a child custody proceeding for violation of its other provisions,
e.g., placement preferences. There is no justification for limiting en-
forcement to those violations listed, as other violations could be equally
damaging to Indian children.
An additional enforcement problem arises because, under the
terms of the Act, the child's parents and tribe are to be notified of a
custody proceeding only if "the court knows or has reason to know that
an Indian child is involved."' 195 To invalidate a child placement for
lack of notice, the parents or tribe must prove not that the child is in
fact an Indian, but that the state court knew or hadreason to know that
the child is an Indian. If the child's Indian status is not discovered until
after the placement, the Act does not mandate reversal. 196 Abandoned
children may be placed irreversibly in non-Indian homes, simply be-
cause their status as Indian children is revealed too late.
193. Washington is one state that adopted special Indian child placement rules prior to
enactment of the Indian Child Welfare Act. WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 388-70-091 to -095,
288-70-450, 388-70-600 to -640. From some tribes' viewpoint these rules go farther than the
Act to protect Indian children's and families' special needs, e.g., by including unenrollable
children.
194. 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (Supp. 11 1978). As drafted, this section applies only to §§ 101-
103 of the Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1911-1913 (Supp. 11 1978).
195. Id. § 1912(a).
196. As a practical matter, a caseworker can do little to identify an abandoned child.
Absent the report of the child or some other person at the scene, followed by a check with
the appropriate tribal office, there is only the child's appearance to go on. If a worker simply
believes a child is Indian, it is still difficult to determine which tribe is to be notified.
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Regulatory Implementation
The bare statutory language of any major new law is likely to pro-
vide little guidance for those seeking to enforce or implement its provi-
sions. The Indian Child Welfare Act certainly is no exception;
consequently, the Act directs the Secretary of the Interior to promul-
gate regulations to carry out its provisions. 197 Generally, implementing
regulations expand the general terms and requirements of a statute and
reconcile superficially inconsistent statements. Most of the regulations
promulgated under the Indian Child Welfare Act by the Interior De-
partment, however, are expressly limited in effect. The regulations
were called "guidelines" and were "not intended to have legislative ef-
fect."' 98 They were published, the Department said, only because
many judges expressed interest in the Department's views.' 99 In dis-
cussing the purpose of the guidelines, the Department has argued that
it was not authorized to mandate state court procedures and that the
primary responsibility for interpreting the Act must rest with state court
judges.200 The Department nonetheless predicts that "[c]ourts will take
what the Department has to say into account,"' 20 ' while remaining "free
to act contrary . . . if they are convinced that [the guidelines] are not
required by the statute itself. '202 The guidelines would help solve a
number of the Act's shortcomings if followed. At the same time, the
197. 25 U.S.C. § 1952 (Supp. 11 1978). The deadline for implementation was May 7,
1979. The first Interior draft was released February 26, 1979, almost four months after the
Act's approval, and dealt primarily with the Act's as yet unfunded grant provisions. This
draft was distributed to tribal chairmen under cover letter from Forrest Gerard, Assistant
Secretary of the Interior, and was accompanied by a Department of Interior News Release
dated February 28, 1979. As a result, a great deal of time and energy was dissipated in field
hearings contracted to the National Congress of American Indians and National American
Indian Tribal Court Judges Association before the Act's most sensitive and significant provi-
sions could be addressed. At least two other inconsistent drafts (one dated April 3 and
another April 19, without further identification) were circulated informally prior to publica-
tion of the official proposal in the Federal Register on April 23. 44 Fed. Reg. 23,992, 23,993,
23,000 (1979). Final regulations were not published until July 31, 44 Fed. Reg. 45,092 (1979)
(to be codified in 25 C.F.R. §§ 13, 23), covering only reassumption, payment of court-ap-
pointed counsel, notification of the Secretary, and grants. Supplemental, non-binding "rec-
ommended guidelines" were published November 26, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584 (1979), covering
placement proceedings. The Secretary of the Interior waived, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,992, 23,993,
24,000 (1979), the provisions of Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (1978). These
provisions call for pre-publication review by all affected parties and for an extended sixty-
day comment period.
198. 44 Fed. Reg. 24,000, 67,584 (1979).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 67,584. See also id at 45,096, 45,097, 45,099.




guidelines themselves raise new problems; hence their effectiveness in
addressing each major area of the Act warrants discussion.
Applicability: "Indian Child"
The Department's guidelines attempt to clarify the application of
the Act to Indian children in a number of ways. First, they suggest that
state courts inquire into the status of every child involved in a custody
proceeding.203 In assessing a child's status, tribal determinations of
membership or eligibility for membership are meant to be conclu-
sive.2°4 Absent a tribal decision or a decision by the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, the guidelines offer five factors indicating "reason to believe"
that a child is an Indian child.205 Of these, only one may be readily
verified on appeal: whether someone has told the court that the child is
an Indian. The remainder are not so easily established or reviewed on
appeal. They include knowledge by an officer of the court that the child
may be an Indian, knowledge by the court or a showing to the court
that the child's or parent's domicile is in a predominantly Indian com-
munity, or indications from the child itself which give the court reason
to believe he or she is an Indian.206 These guidelines fail to consider,
moreover, the situation in which the child's status is not discovered un-
til after the proceeding is begun, an error for which there is no remedy.
In addition, there is no remedy for intentional misrepresentation of a
child's status.
Exclusive Tribal Jurisdiction
The regulations also attempt to clarify the Act's provisions confer-
ring exclusive tribal jurisdiction over child custody proceedings. Be-
cause the Act conditions jurisdiction on the residence or domicile of the
Indian child, several concerns arise. Courts must first determine which
lands are subject to tribal jurisdiction and which are governed by the
state. The regulations authorize reassumption of jurisdiction over ac-
quired tribal lands which were never actually lost to a state.207 They
exclude from tribal jurisdiction lands that once were part of a reserva-
tion but subsequently were lost, not from express statutory language
such as that in Public Law 280, but rather from judicial interpretations
203. Id. at 67,588.
204. Id. at 67,586. As originally proposed, the guidelines subjected tribal determina-
tions to "independent verification" by state courts. Id. at 24,000.
205. Id. at 67,584, 67,586.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 45,092-93.
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of statutes silent as to tribal government. 20 8 The regulations can be
criticized in this regard for conflicting with the Act's attempt to limit
judicial disestablishment of reservations.
20 9
Another concern is the standard to be applied by the Secretary in
evaluating a petition. Expanding at length on the Act's provisions for
tribes' reassumption of exclusive child welfare jurisdiction, the Interior
Department's regulations establish criteria for secretarial approval of
reassumption petitions. Four of the criteria are broadly discretionary,
involving consideration of: whether the tribal "constitution or other
governing document, if any" authorizes the tribe to adjudicate child
custody proceedings; 2t0 whether the tribe's courts comply with the pro-
cedural requirements of the Indian Civil Rights Act; 21' whether the
tribe's child care services are adequate;212 and whether the tribe has a
way of "clearly identifying" its members.
213
The first of these criteria allows the Secretary to sit as a tribal
supreme court, interpreting the tribe's constitutional provisions. Con-
stitutionality under tribal law should be adjudicated, at least in the first
instance, by tribal courts. 21 4 The second and fourth criteria also allow
secretarial judgment on questions of tribal law, while the third places
the Secretary in the position of an expert on child welfare, superior to
the tribe's own child welfare professionals. The Secretary's decisions
will not be readily subject to reversal on appeal as abuses of discretion.
To qualify for reassumption of jurisdiction, 21 5 a tribe must show
that it has sufficient child care services and competent juvenile court
facilities. To obtain funding to start these institutions, however, tribes
may have to show that they have jurisdiction. The regulations are
helpful in that they attempt to avoid a "Catch-22" situation by permit-
208. Id. at 45,092, 45,093.
209. See note 160 supra.
210. Id. at 45,092, 45,096. As originally proposed, this provision lacked the words "if
any," although many large tribes, including Yakima and Navajo, operate under customary,
unwritten constitutions. Id. at 23,992. See also id. at 45,092, 45,096.
211. Id. at 45,092, 45,096 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1976)). The regulations are inten-
tionally broad enough to include unconventional decision-making bodies. See 44 Fed. Reg.
45,092-93, 45,095 (1979).
212. Id. at 45,096. The facilitips need be adequate only for "most" children. Id. at
45,093.
213. Id. at 45,096.
214. This appeared to be the ruling of the Supreme Court in Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). However, the Interior Department feels it has a responsibility
"not [to] exercise its approval power in a manner that authorizes violations of civil rights."
44 Fed. Reg. 45,092, 45,094 (1979).
215. Petition for reassumption is not an admission that the tribe lacked jurisdiction in
the first instance. 44 Fed. Reg. 45,092, 45,092-93 (1979).
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ting tribes to base reassumption petitions on the funds and facilities
they will be eligible to receive !f they reassume jurisdiction. 21 6 The
other side of the problem-tribes that reassume jurisdiction, but do not
receive funds-remains.
Finally, the guidelines address the issue of whether state, federal,
or tribal law will establish the domicile or residence of Indian children.
The Department declined to make tribal law dispositive or to establish
a single uniform federal rule. Instead, the Department has reasoned
that residence and domicile "are well defined under existing state
law." 217 Although not conclusive, this guideline signals state courts
that in the event of a conflict between state and tribal law, the Depart-
ment probably would recognize state law. The result is likely to be
inconsistent treatment of mobile Indian children and families.
Notification
The Act suspends state proceedings until ten days after "receipt of
notice by the parent or Indian custodian and the tribe or the Secre-
tary." 218 In an attempt to provide clarification of the practical meaning
of this provision, the Department of the Interior has suggested that
state courts begin counting after the last of these parties has been noti-
fied.219 In addition, state courts are encouraged to notify both the par-
ents and the Indian custodian; "[elven where only custody is an issue,
noncustodial parents clearly have a legitimate interest in the matter.
'220
Although notice problems remain, the import of the regulations is to
increase tribal participation through notice.
Transfer of Proceedings to Tribal Courts
The guidelines address the problems of transferring proceedings to
tribal courts extensively, if not always constructively. They limit the
transfer option to instances "where the child is not domiciled or resid-
ing on an Indian reservation," 221 thereby preserving an apparently ac-
cidental distinction in the Act.222 This is likely to exacerbate problems
in racing-to-the-courthouse, where a state and tribe share concurrent
jurisdiction over a reservation: if a child who resides on a reservation
216. Id. at 45,095.
217. Id. at 67,585 (emphasis added).
218. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (Supp. 11 1978).
219. 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584, 67,589 (1979).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 67,590.
222. See notes 158-60 & accompanying text supra.
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happens to be seen first in state court, the regulations do not provide
authority for the court to transfer jurisdiction to a tribal court.
The regulations do, however, promote notification of all potential
transferee tribes by suggesting that state courts notify each tribe that
might be the "Indian child's tribe. '223 All of those notified are then
encouraged to assist in determining which tribe has the most significant
contacts with the child.224 As factors to be used in evaluating signifi-
cant contacts, the Interior Department has suggested that the child's
length of residence on the reservation and frequency of contacts with
the tribe be considered, along with the child's participation in tribal
activities and fluency in the language. The Department also has rec-
ommended that consideration be given to the residence of the child's
relatives, the child's expressed self-identification, and whether the tribe
has asserted an interest in the child, either in the past or when notified
of the custody proceeding.225 Between two tribes, actual membership is
considered conclusive by the Department, because "[tihe Act itself and
the legislative history make it clear that tribal rights are to be based on
the existence of a political relationship between the family and the
tribe. ' 226 Overall, this approach considerably improves the approach
implied by the Act itself, as discussed previously.
227
The guidelines go on to suggest that state courts retain jurisdiction
over a custody proceeding unless the child's parents, Indian custodian,
or tribe make a "prompt" request for transfer after having received no-
tice of the proceeding.228 Consequently, judges are encouraged to de-
cide, on a case by case basis, the relative promptness of transfer
requests. The Interior Department has defended this guideline as an
antidote to wait and see tactics, arguing that state judges would have
treated the lateness of requests as "good cause" not to transfer any-
way.229 It may effectively limit the right of families and tribes to inter-
vene if judges exercise broad power to deny transfer requests for lack of
promptness.
223. 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584, 67,586-87 (1979).
224. Id. This suggestion was added in response to comments on the April 23 proposal.
Id. at 24,000.
225. 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584, 67,587 (1979).
226. Id. (emphasis added).
227. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1903(5), 1912(a) (Supp. 11 1978). See notes 143-46 & accompanying
text supra.
228. 44 Fed. Reg. 67,590 (1979). The original proposal, id. at 24,000, 24,001, spoke of a
"timely" request for transfer. The Department of the Interior apparently believes
"promptly" is less vague than "timely." Id. at 67,584, 67,590.
229. Id. at 67,584, 67,590.
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Once a timely request is filed, the Interior Department has sug-
gested that tribal courts be given at least twenty days to respond to a
proposed transfer of jurisdiction. 230 Because tribal courts must know
what time limit to observe, some time limit is necessary to protect their
right to accept transfer of jurisdiction. However, the twenty day mini-
mum is merely advisory, and individual state judges remain free to ac-
cept or reject it. Consequently, tribal courts must poll each state court
judge to ascertain his or her position and should not rely on the
timeframe recommended in the guidelines.
Finally, the guidelines attempt to clarify the broad concept of
"good cause" the Act adopts as a basis for refusing to transfer jurisdic-
tion to a tribal court.231 Unfortunately, the clarification raises new
problems. Listed as examples of good cause are the absence of a tribal
court system, lateness of the request for transfer, objection by the child
(if over twelve years of age), and "undue hardship to the parties or
witnesses. '232 The guidelines suggest that state courts consider the
closeness of the child's relationship to the tribe only if the child is older
than five years and has no living parents to accept or reject the pro-
posed transfer.2 33 The Department has suggested that "socio-economic
conditions and the perceived adequacy of tribal or Bureau of Indian
Affairs social services or judicial systems" should not be considered
good cause to deny a transfer.
234
230. Id. at 67,592. A ten day waiting period originally was proposed. Id. at 24,000,
24,001. To avoid a proposed transfer, the tribal court must affirmatively decline. Unless the
state court hears from the tribe to the contrary within the time limit, it is supposed to dismiss
the proceeding.
231. See notes 162-66 & accompanying text supra.
232. 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584, 67,591 (1979). This differs significantly from the original pro-
posal, id. at 24,000, 24,001, which included: "child's biological parents are deceased or un-
available"; "an Indian custodian or guardian has not been appointed"; and "child has had
little or no contact with his Indian tribe, or members of his tribe, for a significant period of
time." The element of "significant time" invited abuse by state judges; the policy basis for
the other factors is unfathomable. The fact that a child has been orphaned or abandoned is
no evidence that the tribe lacks an interest in his or her future. Suppose, for example, a
school-age child accompanies his or her Indian parents on an employment-related move to a
city. If the parents were killed enroute, there would have been good cause to keep the child's
custody in state court. "Unavailable" also was an overly ambiguous word. The rationale
was perhaps that a dead or "unavailable" parent has -no interest in avoiding transfer for the
courts to protect. However, the term might possibly have been construed to include a parent
hospitalized with a chronic ailment, thereby requiring foster care for the child.
233. This is on the theory that the parents, in exercising their right to object to a transfer,
are the best judges of a child's relationship to the tribe. If they are not in court, or the child
is too young for contacts with the tribe to be a significant issue, state courts are advised to
disregard this factor altogether. .d. at 67,584, 67,591.
234. Id.
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The Interior Department apparently considered transfer to be a
privilege rather than a right, similar to the common law doctrine of
forum non conveniens. This would explain the inclusion of "undue
hardship" as a factor. The Department admits that this criteria will
"limit transfers to cases involving Indian children who do not live very
far from the reservation, '2 35 suggesting that tribal courts should send
their judges to the cities to avoid the denial of transfer. The Depart-
ment's position is unreasonable. A transfer cannot be made over the
parents' or child's objections or without tribal cooperation. Only the
public or private agency that initiated the proceeding could be inconve-
nienced by a transfer.
Emergency Removals
The Department recommends that emergency removals end either
as soon as the emergency ends or when the tribe exercises jurisdiction
over the case.236 In any event, "[a]bsent extraordinary circumstances,"
emergency removals are to end within ninety days.237 Allowing the
child's tribe to end an emergency removal by exercising jurisdiction
can help to limit abuses of the emergency removal provision. The
guidelines, however, do not require notification of the tribe that there
has been an emergency removal. Without notice, the tribe cannot act
to terminate the removal.
Standards of Proof and Placement Preferences
The guidelines recommend that pre-removal attempts by public or
private agencies to prevent family breakups should "involve and use
the available resources of the extended family, the tribe, Indian social
service agencies and individual Indian care givers," 238 ie., medicine
men and other traditional curers. This departure from the Act's gen-
eral language, emphasizing Indian community resources, certainly will
be welcomed by most tribes. It remains to be seen, however, whether
this recommendation will be adopted by state courts.
The guidelines also add to the Act's provision on the standards of
proof in child custody proceedings. The Department suggests that
"poverty, crowded or inadequate housing, alcohol abuse, 239 or non-
235. Id.
236. Id. at 67,589.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 67,592.
239. The inclusion of alcohol abuse as a forbidden element of proof is interesting be-
cause a similar rule was deleted from the Indian Child Welfare Act bill.
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conforming social behavior" does not constitute "clear and convincing"
evidence for removal.2 40 The commentary accompanying the guide-
lines notes that "[t]he legislative history of the Act makes it pervasively
clear that Congress attributes many unwarranted removals of Indian
children to cultural bias on the part of the courts and social work-
ers. ' ' 24 ' The standard of proof used by the courts hopefully will reflect
this manifestation of congressional and departmental intent to mitigate
bias. Insofar as the use of experts to meet this standard is concerned,
the Interior Department suggests that state courts regard as experts tri-
bal members who are recognized within their communities as being
knowledgeable of family matters, lay persons with substantial experi-
ence in tribal social services, and specialized professionals.2 42 While
this too is a welcome refinement, no priority for tribal members is rec-
ommended by the Department.
243
Finally, according to the guidelines, good cause not to follow the
Act's child placement preferences includes the parents' and child's
wishes, the lack of available suitable homes, and any "extraordinary
physical or emotional needs" of the child.244 Remembering that the
Act effectively limits involuntary child custody proceedings to instances
of parental abuse or neglect, it is questionable whether parents' choice
of a substitute home for the child should be given great weight.
Rights of Parents: Payment of Court-Appointed Counsel
The Interior Department believes that it must have broad discre-
tion to reduce, or refuse to pay, the fees of court-appointed counsel in
state child custody proceedings, to "assur[e] they are spent only for a
Congressionally-authorized purpose." 245 Departmental regulations au-
thorize Bureau of Indian Affairs area directors to exercise this discre-
tion by anticipating the rulings of state judges on questions offederal
law, in particular on whether a case is a child custody proceeding
240. 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584, 67,593 (1979). See notes 172-75 & accompanying text supra.
241. 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584, 67,593 (1979).
242. Id.
243. The originally proposed text of the guidelines suggested that a child welfare profes-
sional, Indian or non-Indian, be preferred over a person recognized within the Indian child's
tribe as an authority on tribal social and cultural organization. Id. at 24,000, 24,001. The
uniqueness of each tribe's culture is a strong argument for according tribal members pre-
ferred credibility. Otherwise, state courts would tend to continue to rely on the same "ex-
perts" they relied on prior to the Act-presumably with the same results.
244. Id. at 67,584, 67,594. The original proposal referred simply to the child's "special
needs," a much weaker test. Id. at 42,000, 42,002 (emphasis added).
245. Id. at 45,096, 45,100 (1979).
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within the meaning of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 2 4 6 and on whether
the child is an Indian child within the meaning of the Act.247 In addi-
tion, area directors have discretion to consider questions of state law,
including whether "state law provides for appointment of counsel in
such proceedings,' 248 and whether the state court "has abused its dis-
cretion under state law in determining the amount of fees and ex-
penses. ' 249 Under the authority to determine whether a child is an
Indian child, for example, the state judge and the tribe may agree that a
child is an Indian, but an area director could disagree and withhold
counsel fees.
The area director is placed in the unique position of being a
supreme interpreter of state law. For example, if a state court deter-
mines that, under state law, certain indigent Indian parents are not en-
titled to state-compensated counsel in child custody proceedings and
appoints counsel in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Child
Welfare Act, the area director can nonetheless refuse to pay counsel,
stating that in his or her opinion, state law does provide for state-com-
pensated counsel. Bound by its own interpretation of state law, the
state court cannot pay counsel. As a result, lawyers apprehensive of
such a risk may be hesitant to represent indigent Indian parents.
The Department concluded that to develop its own rules for set-
ting fees would have been less "orderly" and less reliable than leaving
the matter to state courts.250 Departmental regulations direct state
judges to pay Indian parents' counsel according to the same procedures
and criteria they use in juvenile delinquency proceedings. 25' Juvenile
delinquency proceedings, however, are based on a criminal model;
child custody proceedings, on the other hand, involve largely different
questions of fact and different procedures. Accordingly, the compari-
son is neither reasonable nor useful.
Higher Standards of Protection
The Interior Department suggests that state courts choose the law
246. Id. at 45,105.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. The original proposal included a third category of state law for secretarial re-
view: whether the state court "has abused the discretion accorded it under State law to
determine that the client is indigent." d. at 23,993, 23,995. On reconsideration, the Depart-
ment of the Interior concluded that "Congress has left this determination for the courts."
d. at 45,096, 45,1 ).
250. Id. at 41,096, 45,100.
251. Id. at 45,105.
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that is more protective of parents' rights only where doing so "does not
infringe any right accorded by the Indian Child Welfare Act to an In-
dian child or tribe. '252 This limits the danger that the "higher stan-
dards" provision will overcome the Act's departures from state law.
253
However, interpretation of the term "infringe" may prove as fertile a
source of litigation as the phrase "higher standard."
Funding
The major threat to successful implementation of the Indian Child
Welfare Act is a lack of funding for tribal courts and family services.
The Congressional Budget Office planned a five year capital program
for implementing the Act. The plan called for appropriation of
$125,000,000 to build and staff 150 special Indian-controlled child wel-
fare centers. 254 Although barely adequate to achieve the desired goals,
this plan was never funded; Congress has not provided the tribes with
any new funds.
255
Finding themselves financially unable to provide adequate child
services, tribes will face a dilemma. Providing poor services opens
tribes to criticism and jeopardizes their retention of child welfare juris-
diction. On the other hand, failing to exercise fully the rights and pow-
ers offered by the Act opens the tribes to the charge that they lack
interest in child welfare and should not have been offered responsibility
in this area. The result, in either case, could be a clamor for the return
of all child welfare authority to the states.
The shortage of federal financial assistance to tribal courts and
services is particularly unfortunate because states continue to receive
substantial, formula-type federal grants-in-aid for social services, for
which tribes are ineligible.2 5 6 The Act does not offer tribes direct access
to these funds nor does it require states to share them. Although the
Department of the Interior recognizes that, based on equal protection,
individual Indians remain entitled to share in federally-subsidized state
services notwithstanding the Indian Child Welfare Act,257 tribes, in
252. Id. at 67,584, 67,586.
253. See note 192 & accompanying text supra.
254. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, supra note 27, at 29.
255. Funds for implementation of the Indian Child Welfare Act must be appropriated
through the Snyder Act, 25 U.S.C. § 13 (1976). See note 37 supra. Snyder Act funding for
child welfare was not increased following adoption of the Indian Child Welfare Act.
256. Federal Domestic Assistance Programs Hearings Before the Senate Select Commit-
tee on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
257. 44 Fed. Reg. 45,092, 45,093 (1979). However, the Eighth Circuit recently held that
South Dakota could continue to receive Public Health Service Act formula subsidies without
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their governmental capacity, have no power to control the disposition
of these funds. For example, state foster care is federally subsidized.
Consequently, an individual Indian family has a right to be given equal
consideration for licensing as a state foster home, and an Indian child
may be entitled to state foster care support while in the custody of a
state-licensed home. A tribe cannot demand control of a percentage of
the state program or its budget, however.
258
Conclusion
The Indian Child Welfare Act does little to alter the conditions
that Congress held responsible for the unwarranted breakup of Indian
families. The Act does not mandate tribal participation in case plan-
ning or early family intervention. Instead, it assigns tribes to an adver-
sary role after proceedings to remove the child have been initiated.
This limits tribes' ability to prevent family problems. The Act's em-
phasis is on removal and placement, not prevention.
Most of the major procedural safeguards are entrusted to the child
welfare agencies and state courts, which Congress had considered re-
sponsible for the problem initially. State and private agencies deter-
mine who to notify, which Indian tribe is eligible to intervene or to
accept a transfer or jurisdiction, and how long an Indian child can be
kept in an emergency placement without notice or hearing. State
courts have unlimited and unreviewable discretion to deny a transfer of
jurisdiction to tribal courts and to observe or reject the Act's placement
preferences, irrespective of the Interior Department's guidelines. The
Act does not direct state judges to emphasize tribal over state law in
making determinations essential to protection of tribal jurisdiction. No
practical standards are established for state judges' evidentiary use of
cultural materials. The provisions for notice and timing are confusing
and impractical.
Of great concern to some Indian communities, the Act appears to
except children residing on Public Law 280 reservations from its trans-
fer provisions, and to except altogether unenrollable children and
many Alaska Native children. Of even greater concern, the Act makes
no provision for increasing tribes' federal financial support commensu-
rate with their increased responsibility. It is meaningless to have a
making the subsidized health services available to Indians from South Dakota reservations.
White v. Califano, 581 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1978).
258. 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584, 67,585 (1979).
[Vol. 31
INDIAN CHILD WELFARE
right to adjudicate cases and provide services unless there are sufficient
funds to exercise this right.
Many of the Act's protective provisions require an assertion of pa-
rental, tribal, or children's rights bypetition.259 Therefore, for the effec-
tive enforcement of the Act, it is essential that Indian parents and
children understand their federal rights. Because the Act's procedures
are complex and confusing, some effort at public education is essential.
Informational packages could be included with notice of proceedings.
Furthermore, a program of information for state social welfare
caseworkers would be reasonable to avoid unnecessary and unwitting
instances of non-compliance.
In its current state, the Indian Child Welfare Act will do little to
change the situation in states not already committed to its policy. New
legislation will be necessary to assure realization of the Act's purpose.
In the meantime, however, agreements between states and tribes can be
used to clarify and strengthen procedures. Agreements could provide
for cooperative, pre-removal home intervention and support services,
clarification of jurisdiction, and choice of law. Stipulations may elimi-
nate ambiguities in the language of the Act and modify vague or im-
practical time limits, as well as provide for cost-sharing formulas. Both
states and tribes have important incentives to bargain: protection of
each government from fruitless litigation, and protection of children
from delayed or inappropriate attention.
Unfortunately, the Act's weaknesses in drafting and execution
could frustrate even this solution. Although the Act expressly autho-
rizes agreements governing the "care and custody of Indian children
and jurisdiction over child custody proceedings," 260 the Act does not
indicate whether such agreements may supercede its terms. Conse-
quently, agreements may be invalidated by subsequent litigation or leg-
islative action.
In a sense, the Indian Child Welfare Act is a time-bomb. Social
workers and agencies may be tempted to overlook its inconsistencies,
sincerely believing that its policy is plain. But following the noble
259. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (Supp. 11 1978).
260. Id. § 1919(a). Although not specifically addressed by this section, agreements
among tribes, between tribes and Indian organizations, and between states and tribe, are not
prohibited. Agreements between tribes and urban Indian organizations are of special con-
cern because reservations are often at a considerable distance from urban areas where In-
dian children are temporarily subject to state jurisdiction. The expense of sending
representatives to urban child custody proceedings may discourage tribes from participating.
One alternative is for tribes to designate urban Indian centers as their agents in state pro-
ceedings.
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spirit, rather than the obscure letter, of this law is dangerous, because
the Act provides for reversal of any placements made in violation of
many of its requirements.261 Many technical procedural errors may be
made in pursuit of the law's spirit. In a year or two, when disappointed
litigants renew their complaints with increasingly sophisticated law-
yers, many of these placements may be challenged and ultimately re-
versed. Indian children do not deserve this uncertain fate.
261. Id.
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